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ABSTRACT 
 
Safety climate researchers include both general and contextualized items in their 
safety climate measures. However, the relative value of including contextualized items in the 
prediction of safety outcomes is an empirical question that has not been rigorously tested. 
Theories about language comprehension and ambiguity indicate that context facilitates 
meaning. Additionally, memory theories and corresponding empirical research indicates that 
context facilitates recall. By excluding contextual information, general safety climate 
measures might provide a comparatively deficient assessment of the underlying construct as 
indicated by weaker relationships with various safety-related constructs (e.g., safety 
knowledge, injuries, etc.). In the current study, 757 university laboratory personnel 
completed a contextualized safety climate measure (i.e., chemical, biological, animal, or 
human subjects/office research laboratory), a general safety climate measure, and measures 
of a number of other safety-related constructs. In addition, because some safety climate 
dimensions appear more conducive to specificity (e.g., safety equipment & housekeeping, 
co-worker safety practices, and safety training) than others (e.g., management commitment to 
safety), item level analyses were also conducted. Hypotheses were tested by contrasting the 
contextualized vs. the general safety climate correlations with various safety outcomes. Only 
the contextualized human subjects/office laboratory measure was consistently more strongly 
related to the predictors than the general safety climate measure. The results suggest that 
contextualized information might facilitate comprehension and recall for individuals who 
work in less (rather than more) safety-salient contexts. Item-level analyses indicate that 
contextualization for the rewards safety climate dimension is particularly helpful. The results 
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of this study provide a rigorous test of contextualized measure effectiveness; however, 
further research is warranted to explicitly test the underlying theory and boundary conditions 
under which contextual information is beneficial.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 A major tenet of workplace safety research involves effectively predicting and 
limiting workplace accidents and injuries. Unfortunately workplace injuries and deaths 
continue to plague organizations. In 2013, 4,405 workers were killed on-the-job and in 2012 
nearly 3 million private industry employers reported nonfatal injuries and illnesses resulting 
in lost work days (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013a, 2013b).  
 There are a number of variables that contribute to workplace safety (e.g., leadership, 
personality characteristics, job attitudes, safety climate). This study focuses on safety 
climate1: employees’ shared perceptions of the policies, procedures, and practices concerning 
safety, which is a robust predictor of safety outcomes (Beus, Payne, Bergman, & Arthur, 
2010; Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009; Clarke, 2006; Nahrgang, Morgeson, & 
Hofmann, 2011).  
Safety climate is most frequently described as an antecedent of workplace injuries 
(e.g., Christian et al., 2009; Clarke, 2006). Safety climate research, however, includes both 
prospective and retrospective designs and analyses. Beus et al. (2010) proposed that safety 
climate is theoretically both a predictor and an outcome of workplace injuries. Safety climate 
influences behavior-outcome expectancies, leading to actual behavior and outcomes (Zohar, 
2003). At the same time, safety climate perceptions are influenced by employees’ reflection 
                                                     
1Many safety researchers use the term “safety culture” (e.g., Harper & Watt, 2012). 
Industrial/Organizational psychologists distinguish between organizational culture and organizational 
climate (Denison, 1996). Organizational culture is defined as shared assumptions, values, and beliefs 
that characterize an organization (Pettigrew, 1979). Organizational climate is differentiated from 
culture in its definition and reliance on perceptions of organizational policies, procedures, and 
practices. The current proposal focuses on safety climate as it is theoretically the more proximal 
situational variable to behavior that can be measured with a questionnaire. 
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on past incidents (Schneider & Reichers, 1983). The results of their meta-analysis support 
this proposition. They found differences in the relationship between individual and group-
level safety climate and injury rates when differentiating between safety climate as a 
predictor and outcome (injurygroup-level safety climate: ρ = -.29; group-level safety 
climateinjury: ρ = -.24; injuryindividual-level safety climate: ρ = -.16). The current 
study examines self-reported safety outcomes as predictors of safety climate due to the 
convenience of gathering previous safety outcome data and organizational constraints 
preventing the collection of identified data that would facilitate linking of organizational 
records to survey data. 
 Multiple measures of safety climate exist in the multidisciplinary safety literature 
given its theoretical importance and empirical promise. An examination of the research 
literature reveals a proliferation of safety climate measures. Within these measures, there are 
general as well as industry-specific safety climate items. General items are supposedly 
relevant to employees working in any industry. Industry-specific items include risks, 
equipment, and/or procedures that are specific to the industry of interest. However, the extent 
to which industry-specific safety climate measures are more strongly related to safety-related 
constructs compared to a general safety climate measure is an empirical question that has yet 
to be rigorously tested. 
 Theories about the role of context in the memory retrieval process and the facilitation 
of comprehension support the hypothesis that workplace safety-related variables will predict 
industry-specific safety climate better than general safety climate. Industry-specific safety 
climate items incorporate contextual information which assists in the recall process by 
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bringing autobiographical memories into conscious awareness. Additionally, they provide 
meaning for respondents to less-specific, and thus more ambiguous items.  
Compared to industry-specific measures, general measures might be deficient 
assessments of safety climate because they are less effective at facilitating recall and 
comprehension. For example, a general item reads, “There is adequate safety training in my 
workgroup” (Beus, Munoz, Arthur, & Payne, 2013). This item lacks contextual cues to help 
respondents understand the meaning of the item and facilitate recall. In comparison, an 
industry-specific item incorporates the content of training or the ways in which personnel are 
trained in a particular context. For example, the general item listed above is contextualized in 
the present study for human subjects/office laboratories by incorporating examples of the 
content of training, including the standards and guidelines in the TAMU Safety Manual: 
Office Safety. Contextual information helps respondents better comprehend the item and 
facilitates recall of relevant experiences. Contextualized items are theorized to enhance the 
prediction of safety climate by safety knowledge, behavior, and safety-related events.  
 A recent survey of over 2300 laboratory personnel indicated that 46% of the 
respondents sustained one or more injuries while conducting research in a laboratory (Harper 
& Watt, 2012). The present study tests the value of assessing safety climate with a 
contextualized measure using a sample of university laboratory (lab) personnel. Due to the 
inherent differences between university labs, five laboratory-specific safety climate measures 
were developed: animal biological, biological, chemical, mechanical/electrical, and human 
subjects/office. These five measures will be referred to as context-specific measures 
hereafter. 
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The purpose of the present study is to provide a rigorous comparison of a context-
specific safety climate measure to a general safety climate measure. The magnitude of the 
relationship between safety climate and multiple theoretically relevant variables will be 
compared when safety climate is operationalized with a general measure and when it is 
operationalized with a context-specific measure. The other variables examined in this study 
include safety knowledge, safety behavior (participation and compliance), injuries, incidents, 
and near misses. This study also provides an initial exploratory analysis of the conduciveness 
of seven safety climate dimensions to contextualization by conducting item-level analyses. 
The results will begin to inform researchers and practitioners about the value of using 
industry-specific safety climate measures compared to general measures. 
The subsequent sections outline why a contextualized approach to safety climate 
measurement should result in stronger prediction by safety knowledge, behavior, and safety-
related events. First, safety climate, its measurement, and contextualization are discussed. 
The theoretical impetus for contextualized measure effectiveness is then described followed 
by a review of the empirical research examining contextualization of other constructs. 
Following these sections, hypotheses are proposed concerning the magnitude of the 
relationship between safety climate and safety knowledge, behavior, and safety-related 
events when safety climate is measured with a context-specific measure compared to a 
general safety climate measure. Finally, a description of the current study is provided.  
Organizational Climate 
Organizational climate is commonly defined as shared employee perceptions of the 
formal and informal organizational policies, practices, procedures and routines (Ostroff, 
Kinicki, & Muhammad, 2012; Schneider, Ehrhart, & Macey, 2013). Organizational climate 
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research supports the conceptual and empirical distinctiveness between climate and affective 
or evaluative individual reactions (Downey, Hellriegel, & Slocum, 1975; James & Jones, 
1974; LaFollette & Sims, 1975; Rousseau, 1988; Schneider & Snyder, 1975).  
Initial measures of organizational climate were inconsistent and ineffective as 
indicators of individually based outcomes such as satisfaction and job performance (Pritchard 
& Karasick, 1973; Schneider et al., 2013). The molar approach of measuring climate with 6 
to 10 dimensions was too broad to predict specific individual outcomes. Schneider (1975) 
acknowledged the importance of specific climates that match the focus of predicted 
outcomes. Accordingly, there are currently a variety of specific climates and corresponding 
measures in the organizational science literature, including customer service (e.g., Schneider, 
Macy, Lee, & Young, 2009), empowerment (e.g., Chen, Lam, & Zhong, 2007), voice (e.g., 
Morrison, Wheeler-Smith, & Kamdar, 2011), initiative (e.g., Baer & Frese, 2003), and safety 
(e.g., Zohar, 1980).  
Theoretically, organizational climate is a group-level construct. It describes shared 
perceptions of the environment, thus it reflects perceptions of multiple individuals within a 
workgroup, department, or organization. Organizational climate is commonly measured at 
the workgroup level by gathering individual workgroup member perceptions and then 
aggregating (averaging) them. When climate is measured at the individual employee level 
and not aggregated to the group-level, it is referred to as psychological climate (James, Hater, 
Gent, & Bruni, 1978). This study examines psychological rather than organizational climate 
due to organizational constraints inhibiting the ability to identify respondents within the same 
workgroup. 
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Beginning with Zohar (1980), one of the most researched organizational climates is 
safety climate, which is defined as shared employee perceptions of safety policies, practices, 
and procedures (Zohar, 2003). Safety climate exists at all levels within an organization and 
encompasses the formal written policies and procedures as well as the informal unwritten 
practices that actually take place (Jex, Swanson, & Grubb, 2013). For example, the use of 
personal protective equipment might be required through a formal policy, but it might not be 
enforced and thus inconsistently followed. More recent conceptualizations of safety climate 
focus on the degree to which safety is a priority to the organization compared to other 
organizationally relevant behaviors and outcomes (e.g., speed, quality, quantity; Jex et al., 
2013; Zohar, 2010). 
Measurement of safety climate. A number of safety climate measures now exist in 
the safety climate literature. In their recent meta-analysis, Beus et al. (2010) identified 61 
unique safety climate measures. In a follow-up systematic review of over 1500 items within 
these measures (Beus et al., 2013), 33 of the 61 measures included at least one industry-
specific item (e.g., “Policies regarding not recapping used needles are posted;” Day, 1999), 
whereas 28 measures consisted of only general items (e.g., “A busy situation does not 
prevent supervisors from intervening if someone acts against safety rules;” Varonen & 
Mattila, 2000). Safety climate measures have been specified for a number of industries 
including: driving (Wills, Watson, & Biggs, 2006), aviation (Gaba, Singer, Sinaiko, Bowen, 
& Ciavarelli, 2003), remote workers (Huang et al., 2013), and medical contexts (Gershon et 
al., 1995) (see Table 1).  
Zohar (2003, 2010) advocated for the development of industry-specific measures of 
safety climate as the next step in further understanding the safety climate construct. Zohar  
Safety Climate 
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(2010) contends that industry-specific measures hone in on those climate perceptions that are 
especially relevant to a particular industry. He used work-related driving as an example of an 
industry for which safety climate items have been developed. For example, the following 
item is included in a trucking safety climate measure: “My dispatcher insists that I do not use 
in-vehicle communication devices while driving”. As this item indicates, industry-specific 
items frequently incorporate specific hazards that are relevant within a particular industry 
(e.g., needles, working at heights, sub-zero temperatures).  
Zohar (2010) further argues that the identification of specific climate indicators 
enhances our ability to study climate emergence. He contends that responses to industry-
specific safety climate measures provide more detailed information about what processes are 
most important in the emergence of safety climate. For example, the previous item (“My 
dispatcher insists that I do not use in-vehicle communication devices while driving”) 
Table 1 
 
Examples of Industry-specific Safety Climate Items 
 
Source Context Sample item 
Gaba et al. (2003) Naval aviation “My command closely monitors proficiencies 
and currency standards to ensure aircrew are 
qualified to fly.” 
 
Huang et al. (2013) Remote workers “Provides trucks with the best safety 
equipment (back-up cameras, mirrors, bubble 
lights).” 
 
Gershon et al. 
(1995) 
Medical “At my facility, medical waste is properly 
disposed of.” 
 
Wills et al. (2006) Work-related 
driving 
“Driver training is provided on skills specific 
to the type of vehicle driven for work.” 
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compared to a general item: “My company (Top management) is strict about working safely 
when work falls behind schedule” (Huang et al., 2013) might help identify the specific 
indicators most relevant to safety climate emergence in the truck driving industry. 
Incorporating industry-specific hazards and practices into survey items can be likened to 
adding contextual information to a narrative. As such, the revision of general items into 
industry-specific items can also be referred to as contextualizing items. Correspondingly, 
theory and research on contextualization explains why industry-specific measures of safety 
climate could be psychometrically preferable to general measures. 
Contextualization  
A thorough description of context and contextualization is necessary before delving 
into more detail surrounding industry-specific safety climate measures. Context is 
fundamental to the study of human behavior. A long-held and well-accepted psychological 
theory is the premise that behavior is influenced by the interaction between a person and the 
situation (Lewin, 1951). The situation is the context in which the behavior occurs. Context 
has been defined as “the historical, ethical, political, cultural, environmental, or 
circumstantial settings or conditions that influence and complicate the consideration of any 
issues, ideas, artifacts, and events” (Association of American Colleges and Universities, 
2010, p. 1). According to this definition, context refers to a variety of events, settings, or 
conditions and is applicable to different research areas. For example, perception researchers 
study how context might trigger different perceptions of the same stimulus (e.g., Gregory & 
Gombrich, 1973). Memory researchers study context-dependent memory which is the well-
established phenomena that the context in which something is experienced cues memory 
retrieval (e.g., Godden & Baddeley, 1975).  
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Contextualization is most simply defined as the provision of context. The 
contextualization of survey items can be conceptualized on a continuum based on how much 
context is incorporated within the item. At one end of the contextualization continuum are 
items which incorporate little to no context. For example, personality items did not initially 
include contextual information (e.g., “I like initiating conversations with people I do not 
know;” Mount & Barrick, 2007). In the middle of the continuum are items which incorporate 
contextual information, but for broad domains. For example, personality researchers refer to 
contextualization as specifying the focal context within the survey instrument. This is 
typically done by adding the phrase “at [context]” to the end of the item and/or in the 
instructions prior to completing a measure (Shaffer & Postlethwaite, 2012). Personality 
researchers have added “at work” (e.g., Schmit, Ryan, Stierwalt, & Powell, 1995), “at 
school” (e.g., Lievens, De Corte, & Schollaert, 2008), and “at home” (e.g., Heller, Ferris, 
Brown, & Watson, 2009) to personality measures and instructions. At the other end of the 
contextualization continuum are items which incorporate contextual information for a 
specific industry (e.g., trucking), job (e.g., welding), or organization. The most context-
specific types of items incorporate such unique, context-dependent information that they are 
not relevant outside of that context. Industry-specific safety climate measures are an example 
of contextualized measures for more narrow contexts. 
Testing the effectiveness of contextualized measures. This study seeks to determine 
the effectiveness of a contextualized approach to safety climate measurement. It is essential 
to first describe what a rigorous empirical comparison of a contextualized measure to a 
general measure might look like. To maximize internal validity and minimize possible 
confounds, the only thing that will vary between the contextualized and general measure is 
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the inclusion of contextual information. Therefore, the number of items within each measure 
is the same. Also, the same sample of individuals will complete both measures as well as 
other safety-related constructs. This provides variables on which to compare the influence of 
the contextualized and general measures. To enhance external validity, multiple 
contextualized measures will be developed and examined. This study is designed 
accordingly. 
Previous analyses of contextualized safety climate measures are described in the 
following sections and compared with the current study. The current investigation provides a 
more thorough and rigorous analysis of contextualized safety climate measurement. 
Safety climate contextualization. Industry-specific safety climate measures are 
developed a number of different ways. Recognizing the importance of context, some 
researchers alter safety climate measures by simply selecting the items that appear most 
relevant in a particular industry (Glendon & Litherland, 2001; Lee et al., 2014). Other 
researchers develop safety climate measures by writing items that include important industry-
specific safety equipment and policies identified in interviews and surveys with subject-
matter experts (e.g., Huang et al., 2013). No specific technique to developing a 
contextualized or industry-specific measure has been systematically validated. As such, 
researchers develop industry-specific measures in whichever manner they deem appropriate. 
In the current study, a general safety climate measure was contextualized by 
incorporating specific information relevant to the focal context and the core meaning of the 
items. The items were altered while ensuring they remained consistent with the theoretical 
definition of the safety climate construct and their corresponding dimensions. The focal 
context for the current study is university research laboratories. In this study, a research 
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laboratory is defined as a physical indoor space in which research is conducted including wet 
labs, computer labs, but not teaching labs.  
Contextualized measures were developed based on a review of relevant literature, 
including laboratory safety research (Harper & Watt, 2012; National Research Council, 
2014), a handbook (Furr, 2000), and university manuals and inspection checklists (Michigan 
State University, 2014; The Ohio State University, 2014; Princeton University, 2014; Texas 
A&M University, 2009, 2012; Texas Tech University, n.d.; University of Texas at Austin, 
2013; West Virginia University, 2012), as well as interviews with subject-matter experts. 
Five unique laboratory types emerged from the literature review: animal biological, 
biological, chemical, mechanical/electrical, and human subjects/office. Correspondingly, five 
contextualized measures of safety climate were developed. Relevant safety policies and risks 
were added to contextualize the items. For example, a general item, “My co-workers always 
follow safety procedures,” was contextualized to a chemical laboratory by identifying and 
listing common safety procedures for this setting as bullets underneath the item. 
My co-workers always follow safety procedures. This includes: 
The use of PPE 
 Wear appropriate clothes in the laboratory (i.e., closed toe shoes, 
laboratory coat/smock, and full-length shirts and pants) 
 Don appropriate PPE when handling risky equipment, radioactive 
materials, and chemicals (e.g., chemical splash goggles, gloves, hot 
mitts, aprons, respirators, etc.). 
Other standard chemical safety procedures: 
 Use of fume hoods when working with chemicals, radioactive material, 
and any other material that releases hazardous aerosols. 
 Store, label, and date chemicals appropriately. 
 Dispose of waste properly. 
 Respond and react to chemical spills and releases according to 
procedures. 
 Do not eat in the lab and do not store food with laboratory specimens.  
 Do not pipette by mouth.  
 Safety handling and disposal of sharps.  
 Decontamination of equipment and workspaces. 
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 Document safety-related issues and concerns. 
 Operate equipment only after receiving necessary training. 
 
In this study, general safety climate items previously deemed to be true to the 
definition of the safety climate construct (Beus et al., 2013) were revised to include context-
specific information and context-relevant examples. The approach to developing and testing 
the value of contextualization taken in this study was intentionally systematic and rigorous. 
The only alteration to the contextualized measures was the addition of item-relevant context-
specific information. Consequently, any statistical differences that emerge between the 
general and context-specific measures can be attributed solely to the provision of context. 
The effectiveness of the technique utilized in this study and sufficiency of the contextual 
information provided is determined empirically. 
Previous efforts to examine the value of industry-specific safety climate involve 
generating completely new industry-specific measures and comparing their validity to a 
general measure (e.g., Huang et al., 2013). However, it cannot be determined if the observed 
differences between the two types of measures was due to (1) differences the nature of the 
items themselves, (2) the number of items, or (3) the provision of context. A more rigorous 
comparison (as utilized in the current study) only manipulates the variable of interest (i.e., 
context).  
Empirical studies of industry-specific safety climate measures. A review of the 
literature identified only one study that has compared the criterion-related validities of an 
industry-specific safety climate measure to a general safety climate measure. Specifically, 
Huang et al. (2013) developed a 20-item truck driving organization-level safety climate 
measure as well as a 20-item group-level safety climate measure. They compared these 
measures to two 6-item general measures of organization- and group-level safety climate. 
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Their analyses were conducted at the individual-level because there was not sufficient 
agreement to justify aggregation to the group level or sufficient sample size to aggregate to 
the organization level. They tested the value of industry-specific measures based on their 
comparative prediction of self-reported driving behavior (measured concurrently with safety 
climate) and amount of lost work days in the 6-months following initial data collection 
(Huang et al., 2013). The organization and group-level general measures explained 14% and 
10% respectively of the variance in self-reported driving behavior. The organization and 
group-level industry-specific scales explained an additional 6% and 11% respectively above 
and beyond the general measures. When predicting lost work days, only the general scales 
significantly predicted on their own (B = -0.31 and B = -0.21 for the organization and group-
level scales, respectively). The industry-specific measures contributed to the prediction of 
lost work days only when the general measures were also included in the equation (B = -0.87 
and B = -0.73 for the organization and group-level scales). 
Considering the similarity of Haung et al.’s (2013) study to the current study, it is 
important to note the differences between the two, and how this study addresses the 
limitations of Huang et al.’s initial efforts. The current study differs from Huang et al. in a 
variety of meaningful ways. Huang et al. (2013) provide little theoretical explanation for the 
observed differences between industry-specific and general measures. This study seeks to 
explain the usefulness of contextualization based on comprehension and the recall process. 
The current study also develops and compares multiple contextualized measures, whereas 
Huang et al. (2013) developed two industry-specific safety climate measures for one 
industry. Additionally, this study includes an initial analysis of contextualization for seven 
dimensions of safety climate. Lastly, Huang et al. (2013) treated safety climate as a predictor 
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of self-reported driving behavior in their analyses. In the current study, self-report outcome 
data measured concurrently are assessed as predictors of safety climate. 
 Practical advantages and disadvantages of contextualization. General and specific 
measures can also be differentiated based on their practical advantages and disadvantages. 
The practical advantages of general measures result from their broad applicability. That is, 
general measures by their very nature are applicable to people in different contexts. This 
allows for easy comparison, use, and analysis of measures.  
For safety climate in particular, general measures are applicable to employees in 
different types of industries and organizations. For individual organizations, general 
measures are easier to use because the items do not need to be modified or new measures do 
not need to be developed. General measures permit normative and quantitative comparisons 
across organizations because of the commonality of items within an industry. That is, general 
measures can be used as a means of comparison, often called benchmarking, across 
organizations, or across different work groups or departments within an organization because 
they do not change as a function of the specific setting. Finally, general measures apply to a 
variety of industries and thus do not lead to a proliferation of specific measures that tend to 
result in contaminated measures.  
Contextualization is common for applied scientists although not necessarily labeled as 
such. Consulting firms often advertise tailoring or customizing measures to meet the needs of 
an organization (e.g., ProAct Safety, 2012). This can include alterations to general measures 
or the development of new measures making them applicable to a particular industry or 
organization (i.e., contextualization). One notable reason for the continued use of 
contextualized measures in the applied sector is that they might generate more targeted and 
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useful organizational feedback. A measure catered to an industry or organization might offer 
better diagnostic information because the specific items developed include more actionable 
information.  
That being said, contextualized measures are difficult to develop because of the 
variety of relevant safety risks associated with a given industry. For example, university 
laboratory members work with myriad equipment and need to follow complex and detailed 
safety procedures. Even within one type of laboratory (e.g., animal biological), there can be 
considerable variability in the equipment used. It is not feasible to list all safety-related issues 
associated with a given laboratory and consequently it is imperative to identify and include 
the most important safety-related policies in a contextualized safety climate measure. Given 
these constraints, general measures tend to be comparatively easier to develop. 
Relatedly, the addition of contextualized information increases the cognitive load of 
the item and the required reading level for the respondent, especially because contextualized 
items often incorporate complicated terms used in a given industry. Correspondingly, 
contextualized measures might take comparatively longer to complete. This might in turn 
lead to respondent fatigue. Additional disadvantages of contextualized measures that are 
addressed by general measures include the inability to compare across organizations and the 
proliferation of measures. 
Theoretical Value of Contextualization 
It is relatively common in organizational science for researchers to have differences 
in opinion about the best way to measure particular constructs and the level of specificity at 
which they should be measured (Schneider et al., 2013). There are a variety of practical 
trade-offs when it comes to using a general or specific approach. However, arguably the most 
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important factor in determining whether to use a general or more specific approach relies on 
which is more useful. For many measures, and for safety climate in particular, the most 
important deciding factor is which approach is best predicted by or predictive of safety 
incidents. The theoretical value of contextualized measures is based on the idea that context 
facilitates comprehension and memory retrieval during the response process. 
Comprehension. Language comprehension refers to the process of deriving meaning 
from linguistic information by resolving ambiguities (Hunt & Ellis, 2004; MacDonald, 
Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg, 1994). Researchers differentiate between syntactic and lexical 
processes and accompanying ambiguity. Syntactic processes involve identifying relationships 
between words based on sentence structure and grammar (Touragneau & Bradburn, 2010). 
Lexical or semantic processes involve determining the contextually appropriate meaning of 
individual words (MacDonald et al., 1994).  
Syntactic and lexical ambiguity lead to errors in comprehension (Touragneau & 
Bradburn, 2010). Sentences can be misinterpreted or understood differently because of 
ambiguous grammar. For example, the sentence “flying planes can be dangerous” is 
interpreted differently if flying is interpreted as a verb or adjective (Touragneau & Bradburn, 
2010). Although rare, syntactic ambiguity is not uncommon in survey research (Fillmore, 
1999). Excessive grammatical complexity, including multiple and/or embedded clauses, can 
lead to working memory overload (Tourangeau & Bradburn, 2010).  
The meaning of individual words can also be interpreted differently based on lack of 
knowledge or appropriate contextual information. Many survey items incorporate technical 
terminology, the meaning of which might not be known by all respondents (Tourangeau & 
Bradburn, 2010). More commonly used words can also be interpreted incorrectly if they are 
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not contextually defined. For example, Belson (1981) found that people apply different age 
cutoffs to “children”. Response categories might also be ambiguous. For example, people 
differ in how they interpret “not too often” and “very often” (Schaeffer, 1991).  
Context assists in lexical processing by providing contextual meaning to individual 
words. This is evident in language comprehension during daily interactions. In everyday 
communication people provide context by giving more detailed information or history about 
a circumstance in order for others to better understand a particular situation. For example, an 
individual might describe a car accident by first explaining where they were driving, what 
time of day it occurred, how many cars were on the road, etc. Similarly, inside jokes are 
those that are understood by only a few; historical context needs to be provided in order for 
an outsider to understand and “get” the joke. People respond to and understand a situation 
differently when they know the context of a particular event. For example, when an 
individual learns about a death in someone’s family, it is likely to be perceived quite 
differently if the mourner recently experienced a similar loss. 
Memory and the retrieval process. Memory refers to the influence of past 
experiences on present thought and behavior (Hunt & Ellis, 2004; Hunter, 1957). The 
memory system is described as an information-processing model, which is based on 
encoding, storage, and retrieval (Melton, 1963). In order to remember something an 
individual needs to process the information in their brain, retain it for a period of time, and be 
able to retrieve it later (Melton, 1963).  
Long-term memory refers to the brain’s storage mechanism and is categorized into 
semantic and episodic or autobiographical memory (Tourangeau & Bradburn, 2010). 
Semantic memory consists of information about vocabulary, language, and general 
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knowledge about the world (Tourangeau & Bradburn, 2010). Autobiographical memory 
consists of stored information about individual events, common sequences of events, and 
extended life events (Conway, 1996; Schank & Abelson, 1977). These memories include 
individual experiences as well as experiences with others, including witnessing other 
people’s behavior. Both of these experiences are likely to be recalled when completing a 
safety climate inventory. 
Conway (1996) described autobiographical memory in three hierarchical levels 
according to specificity: life-time periods, general events, and event-specific knowledge. 
Life-time periods are the least specific category of memories. Knowledge of life-time periods 
encompass those goals and common activities, locations, and actions that represent each 
particular period. Contained within life-time periods are general events, which are more 
specific memories that include general knowledge of repeated events, extended events, and 
minihistories. At the most detailed level, individuals store knowledge of the content of 
general events, referred to as event-specific knowledge. 
Long-term and working memory interact in the memory retrieval process 
(Tourangeau & Bradburn, 2010). Working memory refers to active cognitive processing of 
incoming auditory and visual information (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). Working memory 
processes incoming information that people experience on a daily basis and makes sense of it 
by connecting it to long-term memory. When trying to remember something, as a person is 
likely to do when responding to a survey, information is moved from long-term memory to 
working memory, bringing the information into conscious awareness (Tourangeau & 
Bradburn, 2010).  
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Context is a key component of the memory process, serving as an influential aspect of 
encoding and retrieval. Events occur within context. Likewise, the memory of events is 
encoded within context (Ashcraft & Radvansky, 2013; Myers, 2014). Context serves as a 
linking mechanism within long-term memory. When an individual encodes an event, he/she 
also includes other bits of information (Ashcraft & Radvansky, 2013; Myers, 2014). This 
additional information can serve as a retrieval cue, defined as “any words, images, or 
emotions, etc. that activate or direct the memory search process” (p. 322; Tourangeau & 
Bradburn, 2010). Context helps in the retrieval process by moving long-term memories 
associated with a given context to conscious awareness (Tourangeau & Bradburn, 2010). 
This process involves controlled (i.e., trying to remember something) and automatic 
components. For example, when attempting to remember something, an individual might 
picture himself or herself in the same context that they experienced the event. This can also 
occur outside of awareness. For example, a song might activate past memories because of its 
connection to previous experiences.  
In support of the value of context to retrieval are studies which indicate that recall is 
enhanced when an individual is put back in the context where they experienced something. 
This often refers to physical context. Scuba divers listened to word lists in two different 
settings and recalled more of the words when they were retested in the same place (Godden 
& Baddeley, 1975). This also includes the state in which a memory is encoded. Emotions 
which accompany events can serve as retrieval cues such that a memory is easier to recall 
when an individual is in the same mood (e.g., Fiedler, Nickel, Muehlfriedel, & Unkelbach, 
2001).  
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Retrieval cues in survey research. Researchers assess the effects of questionnaire 
design and the addition of retrieval cues in order to enhance recall, focusing mainly on self-
reports of factual information. The retrieval process takes time (Krosnick & Presser, 2010). It 
follows that increasing the time it takes respondents to complete items will lead to more 
accurate reporting (Krosnick & Presser, 2010). In one study, longer questions led to increases 
in the reporting of health events, chronic conditions, and sensitive behaviors (e.g., Bradburn 
et al., 1980). Specifically, Bradburn et al. (1980) found that recall of alcohol consumption 
was improved when they cued respondents with locations and social occasions that were 
associated with drinking. Likewise, Lessler, Tourangeau, and Salter (1989) found that people 
reported more dental visits when they provided respondents with a list of common reasons 
why people go to the dentist. Researchers have listed common types of assault to provide 
contextual cues (e.g., assault with any weapon: for instance, gun, knife, scissors) instead of 
asking if respondents were assaulted, which led to more complete recall (Biderman, Cantor, 
Lynch, & Martin, 1986). 
Another retrieval method used in survey research is decomposition, which involves 
dividing a broad question into smaller parts (Krosnick & Presser, 2010). Cannell et al. (1989) 
improved reporting accuracy by decomposing health care visits into four types: overnight 
hospital stays; other times a doctor was seen; times a doctor was not seen, but a nurse or 
medical assistant was; and times a medical personnel was consulted by telephone. Mean and 
Loftus (1991) found that recall of health care visits and dating was improved when they 
decomposed generic memories with a calendar time line. Similarly, Belli, Smith, Andreski, 
and Agrawal (2007) found that providing personal calendars with key events in a 
respondent’s life improved the reporting of other events. Other research has shown that 
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checklists might be useful to decompose a question (Smyth, Dillman, Christian, & Stern, 
2006).  
Safety climate is a perceptual variable; thus the accuracy of the measurement of this 
construct cannot be verified with information from another source. However, various safety-
related events like personally falling on a slippery shop floor, observing a coworker be 
disciplined for not wearing his/her personal protective equipment, and contributing to safety 
discussions in daily workgroup meetings can be verified by another source of data. These 
events are likely to be recalled and contribute to a respondent’s assessment of safety climate. 
To the extent that contextual information within a survey instrument facilitates recall of 
safety-related events, safety climate assessments may be affected. 
 The survey response process. There are a variety of theories concerning the mental 
steps people undergo when responding to survey items (e.g., Cannell, Marquis, & Laurent, 
1977; Thurstone, 1927; Tourangeau, 1984). According to Tourangeau and colleagues’ 
(Tourangeau, 1984; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988) model which is reproduced in Figure 1, 
the response process consists of four major steps: (1) comprehension of the item; (2) retrieval 
of relevant information; (3) use of that information to make required judgments; and (4) 
selection and reporting of an answer. As noted, first the respondent must comprehend the 
item. In other words, it must be meaningful to the respondent. The following step in the 
response process involves retrieval of the relevant information that is prompted by the survey 
item. This step relies on accurate recall of memories of experiences. Thus, the item is 
assumed to trigger the retrieval process (Jobe, Tourangeau, & Smith, 1993). After recall, 
individuals form judgments in order to transform the information they have remembered into 
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Figure 1. Components of the response process (Tourangeau et al., 2000, p. 8). 
an appropriate response (Tourangeau, Ripps, & Raskinski, 2000). Individuals map their  
response onto the appropriate scale or option, considering consistency, acceptability, and a 
variety of other potential factors, and then choose a response option (Tourangeau et al., 
2000). 
 There are a variety of other theories proposing models of the response process (e.g., 
Krosnick & Alwin, 1987). However, most theories, including the one presented by 
Tourangeau (1984), are fundamentally similar. Most theories incorporate memory and recall 
as essential to the response process. This implies that the extent to which the respondent is 
able to comprehend the meaning of an item and recall relevant memories is critical to the 
validity of their response. The following sections describe the application of comprehension, 
memory, and recall to the measurement of safety climate. 
The response process, comprehension, memory, and safety climate. Respondents 
completing safety climate measures generally follow the response process described by 
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Tourangeau et al. (2000). They read and comprehend each item, retrieve relevant information 
specified within the item, make a judgment based on their retrieval, and select an answer that 
aligns with their perception. 
Both general and industry-specific safety climate items prompt respondents to search 
their autobiographical memory for relevant experiences. For example, in a general safety 
climate measure, respondents are instructed to read statements and mark the response that 
indicates the degree to which they agree. A general item reads “employees in my workgroup 
are given sufficient safety equipment” (Beus et al., 2013). Individuals are prompted to recall 
the sufficiency with which safety equipment is provided. Upon reading the following 
industry-specific safety climate item, “My company (Top management) provides trucks with 
the best safety equipment (back up cameras, mirrors, bubble lights)” (Huang et al., 2013), 
respondents recall the degree to which the organization provides their trucks with back up 
cameras, mirrors, and bubble lights. 
Despite similarity in the response process, contextualized and general items might 
facilitate comprehension and activate retrieval differently. Like context in a story, 
contextualized information provides meaning for respondents when they complete a survey. 
Specifically, context limits the lexical ambiguity associated with general items. For example, 
a general item reads, “my supervisor praises safe work behavior” (Beus et al., 2013).  The 
words “praises”, “safe”, “work, and “behavior” might be lexically ambiguous because they 
can be understood to mean different things. Praising safe work behavior can refer to a variety 
of behaviors such as providing positive feedback, giving employees more discretion, and 
distributing awards. As such, individuals are likely to vary in what they infer the item to 
mean. Contextualized information addresses the ambiguity of general items by explicitly 
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incorporating more detailed information to facilitate more consistent and accurate 
interpretation. General items are more ambiguous and consequently open to subjective 
interpretation.  
The memory system is described as a network of linked concepts, which can be 
activated by context. Contextualized safety climate items should prompt information from 
autobiographical memory, bringing memories to conscious awareness. Put simply, 
respondents are more likely to remember relevant experiences when responding to 
contextualized items. General items should be less effective at assisting in the retrieval 
process because they incorporate fewer contextual cues. Respondents are unlikely to recall 
all relevant information and experiences when responding to general items.  
Construct relevance.  Ideally a measure is a perfect representation of the construct of 
interest. The overlap between the theoretical construct and its measure is referred to as 
construct relevance. Deficiency and contamination are two terms used to describe the degree 
to which a measure does not appropriately represent the construct domain space (Messick, 
1995). Deficiency describes the extent to which a measure does not adequately and 
completely represent the construct domain space. Contamination describes the extent to 
which a measure assesses irrelevant information that is not a part of the theoretical construct. 
More construct relevant measures should be more predictive of theoretically relevant 
outcomes compared to measures that are deficient and/or contaminated. 
In describing survey research that incorporates context, Krosnick and Presser (2010) 
note that “events characterized by uncued features are apt to be underreported relative to 
those with cued features” (p. 290). Safety climate items potentially cue respondents to recall 
and reflect on prior experiences concerning safety in their work environment. Compared to 
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contextualized measures, general measures of safety climate are less likely to cue memories 
of specific events. For example, upon reading the following safety climate item “Equipment 
in my work area is checked to make sure it is free of faults,” respondents should reflect on 
the various types of equipment used in their workspace, the frequency with which it is 
checked, as well as the frequency with which it is determined to be free of faults. Without 
prompts or cues to remind them, individual respondents are less likely to recall all relevant 
experiences.  
In contrast, contextualized safety climate measures that cue respondents to think 
about specific risks and issues might display stronger relationships with safety outcomes 
because of more construct-relevant responding. For example, a contextualized item reads, 
“Equipment in my lab is checked to make sure it is free of faults” and is followed by a list of 
equipment likely to be used in the respondent’s lab. By listing the specific equipment used in 
the focal environment of interest, respondents might be reminded of specific equipment and 
experiences, and therefore provide a more construct relevant response. 
 Specificity in other psychological measures. Measure contextualization for 
psychological constructs is not a new concept. Despite notable differences between 
previously contextualized constructs and safety climate, research tends to indicate that 
contextualization is beneficial. For instance, researchers have demonstrated the value of 
contextualizing measures of locus of control and the Big Five personality traits. 
Spector (1988) defined locus of control as “a generalized expectancy that rewards . . . 
are controlled either by one’s own actions (internally) or by other forces (externality)” (p. 
335). General measures of locus of control displayed modest relationships with work-related 
outcomes (Spector, 1988). Contextualized measures were developed to better predict work 
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outcomes. Work locus of control is a context-dependent construct that is bounded by the 
rewards or outcomes (e.g., promotion, pay) in the work setting (Spector, 1988). Research 
generally supports the heightened relationships between work locus of control and work 
outcomes compared to general measures of locus of control. 
Much like locus of control, personality inventories consist of primarily general items 
that have low criterion-related validities with job performance. The cognitive-affective 
system theory is based on the premise that behaviors are contextually specific and are better 
predicted when people are given a context, or frame-of-reference (Lievens, De Corte, & 
Schollaert, 2008; Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Wright & Mischel, 1987). The contextualization 
of personality measures has improved the criterion-related validity of personality inventories 
as predictors of job performance (Bing, Whanger, Davison, & VanHook, 2004; Hunthausen, 
Truxillo, Bauer, & Hammer, 2003; Lievens et al., 2008; Schmit et al., 1995). In a recent 
meta-analysis of the frame-of-reference effect, Shaffer and Postlethwaite (2012) found that 
personality measures altered to cue the work context have greater validity when predicting 
job performance. Contextualized measures of Conscientiousness (ρ = .30 vs. ρ = .22), 
Emotional Stability (ρ = .27 vs. ρ = .11), Extraversion (ρ = .25 vs. ρ = .08), Agreeableness (ρ 
= .14 vs. ρ = .10), and Openness to Experience (ρ = .14 vs. ρ = .02) had greater predictive 
validity than general measures.  
In summary, the previous discussion provides theoretical support for the 
contextualization of safety climate measures based on item ambiguity, language 
comprehension, and memory and recall during the response process. This will be tested by 
comparing how safety climate relates to six safety variables when it is operationalized with a 
general measure compared to a contextualized measure. 
  
27 
Hypothesis 1: A contextualized safety climate measure will have a significantly 
stronger positive relationship with (a) safety knowledge and (b) behavior than a general 
safety climate measure. 
Hypothesis 2: A contextualized safety climate measure will have a significantly 
stronger negative relationship with (a) injuries, (b) incidents, and (c) near misses than a 
general safety climate measure. 
Further Evidence for the Value of Safety Climate Item Contextualization 
Dimensions of safety climate. Although safety climate researchers tend to agree on 
the definition of safety climate and its multidimensional nature, there is not universal 
consensus on the number and nature of those dimensions. The number of dimensions 
included in various safety climate measures ranges from one (e.g. Neal & Griffin, 2006) to 
twelve (Krispin, 1997). The following safety climate dimensions were recently rated by 
subject matter experts as neither contaminated nor deficient: management commitment to 
safety, safety communication, co-worker safety practices, safety training, safety involvement, 
safety rewards, and safety equipment & housekeeping (Beus et al., 2010). Correspondingly, 
Beus et al. (2013) developed a general measure of safety climate that includes these seven 
dimensions. Definitions and example items for each dimension appear in Table 2.  
The inclusion of context in a safety climate measure is based on the premise that the 
information associated with an industry is unique and important to acknowledge. Some 
safety climate dimensions lend themselves to contextualization more so than others. For 
example, industry-specific practices can be easily added to the co-worker safety practice 
dimension. In contrast, rewarding safety behavior is not likely to look all that different from 
one industry to the next. Safety climate dimensions conducive to contextualization are  
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Table 2 
 
Safety Climate Dimensions, Definitions, and Sample General Items. 
 
Dimension Definition Sample item 
Management commitment to safety  The extent to which employees perceive 
that their supervisor is dedicated to 
providing a safe workplace. 
“My supervisor takes a proactive stance 
when it comes to safety.” 
Safety communication Perceptions of the effectiveness of 
communication concerning safety. 
“Safety problems are openly discussed 
between my supervisor and my 
workgroup.” 
Co-worker safety practices Perceptions of the extent to which 
employees’ fellow co-workers are 
committed to safety. 
“My co-workers always follow safety 
procedures” 
Safety training The extent to which employees perceive 
that the safety training is sufficient. 
“There is adequate safety training in my 
workgroup.” 
Safety involvement The extent to which employees perceive 
that they are involved in workplace safety. 
“My supervisor promotes employees’ 
involvement in safety related matters.” 
Safety rewards The extent to which employees perceive 
that organizational leaders support safety 
behavior. 
“My supervisor rewards safe behaviors” 
Safety equipment & housekeeping The extent to which employees perceive 
that they have been provided proper safety 
equipment and the working conditions are 
maintained to ensure safety. 
“My supervisor provides safe working 
conditions” 
Note. From Beus et al. (2013). 
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expected to show even stronger relationships with safety outcomes than safety climate 
dimensions that are less conducive to contextualization. The safety climate dimensions 
hypothesized to be most suited to contextualization are safety equipment & housekeeping, 
co-worker safety practices, and safety training. 
Safety equipment & housekeeping. The types of safety equipment used and the 
importance of housekeeping is largely a function of the inherent and specific risks on the job. 
Equipment varies extensively from personal protective equipment like gloves, goggles, and 
boots, to hazard signs and splash guards. Housekeeping is about keeping the environment 
clean, safe, and limiting hazards on the job like mopping up spilled water and properly 
storing equipment to extend its lifetime as well as prevent harm to workers. 
Co-worker safety practices. The co-worker safety practices dimension captures 
workgroup norms concerning safety behavior. For example, co-worker safety practices 
include wearing appropriate personal protective equipment, obtaining permits to conduct 
dangerous work, and refusing to deviate from specific safety procedures (e.g., always 
wearing a harness when working at heights). The most relevant co-worker behaviors concern 
following or not following safety policies, practices, and procedures, which are a function of 
the job-specific risks and hazards. Thus, survey items within this dimension seem suited for 
item contextualization. 
Safety training. The content of safety training is inevitably a function of the specific 
risks and hazards on the job; thus this safety climate dimension is also expected to be 
conducive to contextualization. The safety training dimension concerns the extent to which 
safety training is made available to the people who need it and when they need it, the 
adequacy and appropriateness of the training content relative to the risks and hazards on the 
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job, and how seriously training is taken by management and employees within the 
organization.  
Safety communication. It is unclear if communication, rewards, and involvement are 
more or less conducive to contextualization. Communication items capture the extent to 
which information is flowing, employees are kept informed, and the timeliness of 
communication concerning safety. Communication is critical to safety climate because it is 
the primary means by which employees are made aware of the other dimensions like the 
priority of safety, rewards for safe behavior, and opportunities for involvement. The specific 
means by which companies convey information might be unique (e.g., meetings, signs, 
memos, newsletters) and thus the communication dimension might benefit from 
contextualization. 
Safety rewards. Rewarding safe behavior items capture the extent to which there are 
incentives for behaving safely. On the one hand, rewarding safe behavior seems to be rather 
generic and does not warrant contextualization. On the other hand, the way each organization 
rewards safe behavior can vary and therefore lend itself to item contextualization, should that 
information be made available. 
Safety involvement. Employees can be involved in organizational safety a number of 
different ways. For example, some organizations have safety committees, safety officers or 
representatives who are volunteers or elected by their peers, and/or opportunities to make 
anonymous suggestions about safety. The extent to which organizations make formal efforts 
to facilitate employee involvement in safety is likely to be related to the inherent risk of the 
work and thus, more prevalent in certain industries. However, the general notion of seeking 
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employee input is not contextualized, so this dimension might be less conducive to 
contextualization.  
Management commitment to safety. The management commitment to safety 
dimension of safety climate is a broad dimension that seems least conducive to 
contextualization. This dimension concerns the extent to which management prioritizes 
safety over other competing organizational priorities like productivity. It captures the extent 
to which management invests in the resources necessary to be safe like personal protective 
equipment and other safety equipment and their responsiveness to safety concerns, issues, 
and problems. This dimension consistently emerges as a core dimension of safety climate 
(e.g., Flin et al., 2000) and has been proposed to be a higher order dimension of safety 
climate (Beus et al., 2013). Based on the previous discussion, those safety climate 
dimensions that align most closely with specific policies, practices, and procedures should 
have a comparatively stronger relationship with safety-related variables. However, the 
current study only utilizes one general item from each dimension with an additional item for 
management commitment and safety equipment & housekeeping. As such, the current 
investigation seeks to describe patterns of the relationship between dimensions and outcomes 
for general and contextualized measures rather than test specific hypotheses. 
Research Question 1: Are some safety climate dimensions more conducive to 
contextualization than others as indicated by their relationships with (a) safety knowledge, 
(b) safety behavior, (c) injuries, (d) incidents, and (e) near misses? 
The Current Study: University Research Laboratory Safety 
This study utilizes a university research laboratory sample to examine contextualized 
and general safety climate measurement. The following section provides an overview of the 
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risks associated with research laboratories and contextualized measure development for five 
laboratory types. 
Assessments of safety climate within the university laboratory environment are 
limited despite the occurrence of numerous accidents and injuries (Wu, Chen, & Li, 2008). In 
a 2012 survey of 2,374 laboratory personnel, 46% indicated that they had sustained at least 
one injury during their time working in a laboratory (Harper & Watt, 2012). Recent cases of 
safety accidents and injuries at university laboratories also highlight the importance of safety. 
Some of the most widely publicized took place at the University of California Los Angeles in 
2008 (1 death), Texas Tech in 2010 (1 severe injury), and Yale University in 2011 (1 death) 
(National Research Council, 2014). It is important to acknowledge that laboratories exist 
beyond colleges and universities meaning that our results will generalize to laboratories in 
other settings (e.g., Los Alamos National Laboratory, Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory).  
University laboratory personnel are exposed to toxic chemicals, electrical hazards, 
sources of radiation, and biological agents, among other potential hazards (DeRoos, 1977). 
As a result, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) instituted research 
laboratory standards including communication of laboratory hazards, the personal protective 
equipment standard, the eye and face protection standard, and the respiratory protection 
standard (Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 2012). They also instituted a 
specific set of standards concerning hazardous chemicals (Occupational Exposure to 
Hazardous Chemicals in Laboratories, 1990). A variety of additional references have been 
published for more current and specific laboratory safety issues (e.g., U.S. Department of 
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Health and Human Services’ Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories), 
which are used by institutions to develop individualized laboratory safety manuals. 
Furr’s (2000) handbook on laboratory safety offers a comprehensive summary of the 
multitude of safety procedures associated with laboratories across academic disciplines and 
settings. Furr (2000) categorized laboratory safety into two broad domains: chemical and 
non-chemical laboratories. Chemical laboratories are those that primarily work with 
potentially hazardous chemicals. Non-chemical laboratories include biological as well as 
animal biological laboratories. Furr (2000) also summarized safety for radioisotope, x-ray, 
laser, and recombinant DNA laboratories. Many of these additional facilities/laboratories are 
subsumed within chemical, biological, and animal biological laboratories.  
Contextualized measurement development. Three contextualized measures were 
developed based on Furr’s (2000) categorization of the three laboratory types (chemical, 
biological, and animal biological laboratories). His categorization of laboratories, however, 
omits mechanical/electrical (e.g., physics, mechanical engineering) and human subject/office 
laboratories. As such, two additional contextualized measures were developed based on 
university laboratory manuals, interviews with laboratory personnel, and tours of local 
laboratories. A generic or uncategorized measure was also developed, which combines all the 
unique elements of the five lab-specific measures into one measure. The generic measure was 
developed for the sole purpose of giving respondents who did not classify themselves into 
one of the five laboratories a contextualized measure to complete. 
There were two other options for categorizing and developing laboratory-specific 
safety climate measures: developing one general laboratory-specific measure or developing 
contextualized measures based on academic subject. The first option does little to 
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acknowledge the variety of unique safety issues in particular laboratories. The second option 
involves the development of numerous measures, many of which would not be meaningfully 
different. A compromise between these two options was chosen based on five categories that 
acknowledge unique and meaningful differences in risks, hazards, equipment, and safety-
related policies. 
  
 35 
2. METHOD 
 
Sample 
 Laboratory personnel across the variety of laboratories at Texas A&M University 
were contacted and asked to participate. There are over 3,000 laboratories regulated by 
environmental health and safety (EHS) and biosafety at Texas A&M University, which 
encompass a number of different academic disciplines including biology, chemistry, physics, 
and engineering. The EHS laboratory safety, industrial hygiene, and biosafety groups oversee 
laboratory safety at Texas A&M University. The industrial hygiene and biosafety group work 
within EHS ensure that safety practices are implemented and utilized and that international, 
national, and state safety standards are followed. Additionally, they develop and implement 
safety policies and protocols, inspect labs, report results, and provide safety training. 
 As a brief overview of the structure of EHS, the Laboratory Safety Committee is in 
charge of recommending and developing policy, guidance, and safety manuals applicable to 
laboratory safety. Academic/college deans are responsible for communicating and 
implementing safety information and polices. Department Heads and Directors report to 
Deans and are in charge of promoting safety and ensuring that safety polices are 
implemented and followed. Faculty/Principal Investigators (PIs) are held accountable for 
leading their individual laboratories and ensuring that safety polices are followed. Employees 
(e.g., staff) and students work within individual laboratories and report to their laboratory 
supervisor/manager (either another -- usually graduate or post doc -- student/employee 
supervisor or directly to the PI).   
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Table 3 
 
Respondents’ Demographic Characteristics 
 
Demographics M (SD) 
Sex 
 
338 men; 46.6% 
Age (years) 
 
30.89 (SD = 13.21) 
Tenure (years) 
 
3.52 (SD = 5.98) 
Laboratory size (number of laboratory members) 10.21 (SD = 9.52) 
 
The current study solicited participation from all PIs and the employees and/or 
students working in individual laboratories. A total of 969 individuals responded to the 
survey. Of those, 111 indicated that they were not laboratory personnel, 94 opened or clicked 
through the survey without responding, and 7 additional responses were removed as outliers 
for having responses that were at least five standard deviations from the mean (e.g., 40,578 
injuries in the past 12 months). The final dataset of laboratory personnel included 757 
responses. Demographic information is provided in Table 3. A majority of participants were 
Graduate Students (n = 229), followed by Undergraduate Students (n = 183), Research 
Scientists (n = 101), Post-Docs (n = 28), Lab Managers (n = 25), Principal Investigators (n = 
23), and Research Associates (n = 22). Most respondents were personnel from biological 
laboratories (n = 219), followed by animal biological (n = 212), human subjects/office (n = 
126), chemical (n = 124), mechanical/electrical (n = 65), and other (n = 11) laboratories. 
Those respondents from uncategorized laboratories specified that they work in nuclear 
physics, nuclear engineering, cereal grain, materials research, and hydropedology labs. The 
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categorization of five laboratory types appears to be relatively inclusive considering only a 
small number of respondents were from uncategorized labs. 
Procedure 
This study utilized a within-subjects survey design via a web-based questionnaire 
using Qualtrics software. Laboratory personnel of all levels from undergraduate students to 
Principal Investigators (PI) were asked to complete a general safety climate measure and 
contextualized safety climate measure based on their corresponding laboratory type. This was 
determined based on their response to a skip logic question in which they indicated if they 
worked in an animal biological, biological, chemical, mechanical/electrical, human 
subject/office, or other laboratory. The general and contextualized measures were 
counterbalanced. Participants also completed measures of safety-related outcomes including 
safety knowledge, behavior, and incidents (i.e., injuries, incidents, and near-misses). All 
measures were completed at the individual-level because organizational constraints 
prohibited collecting identified data that would have allowed aggregation to the laboratory 
level. 
In order to recruit participants, a bulk e-mail was sent to the distribution list of all 
faculty, staff, and students at Texas A&M University with an incentive to enter in a drawing 
to win one of five $100 VISA gift cards. The bulk e-mail was sent to over 65,000 
subscribers. A recruitment email was also sent to faculty, staff, and students who completed 
online safety training in the last 2 years as well as individuals who are identified as Principal 
Investigators at the university. The survey was open between December 22, 2014 and 
February 1, 2015. One reminder message was sent on January 20, 2015. 
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Measures 
 General safety climate. Beus et al.’s (2013) safety climate measure was used as the 
general safety climate measure in this study. The measure consists of 30 items that are 
responded to on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The 
items are subsumed under seven dimensions (i.e., management commitment to safety, safety 
communication, co-worker safety practices, safety training, safety involvement, safety 
rewards, and safety equipment & housekeeping). For the purposes of the current study, nine 
items from the 30-item measure were utilized (see Appendix A). Beus et al. (2013) 
developed an eight item short form from their 30-item measure; however, the nine items in 
the current study were identified based on two considerations: (1) a thorough analysis of the 
items and their conduciveness to alterations and (2) factor loadings of the 30-item measure 
from Beus et al. (2013). The nine-item measure includes one item for each dimension and 
two items from management commitment to safety and safety equipment & housekeeping. 
Slight alterations were made to general items to ensure that individuals respond according to 
their experiences in a laboratory and the behavior of their laboratory manager/PI. For 
example, items that referred to “my supervisor,” and “my co-workers” were altered to “my 
laboratory manager/PI” and “my co-workers in the lab,” respectively. These slight alterations 
are not considered to be contextualization, but rather common practice as they are meant only 
to ensure that individuals are thinking about a research laboratory (rather than industry). The 
coefficient alpha of the nine-item general measure in the current study was .95. 
 Contextualized safety climate. Six laboratory contextualized measures were 
developed: animal biological (Appendix B), biological (Appendix C), chemical Appendix 
D), mechanical/electrical (Appendix E), human subjects/office (Appendix F), and generic 
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(Appendix G). For each laboratory type, specific policies, practices and procedures, 
equipment, issues, and risks were identified. This information was gleaned from Furr’s 
(2000) handbook of laboratory safety, laboratory safety research (Harper & Watt, 2012; 
National Research Council, 2014), and university manuals and inspection checklists 
(Michigan State University, 2014; The Ohio State University, 2014; Princeton University, 
2014; Texas A&M University, 2009, 2012; Texas Tech University, n.d.; University of Texas 
at Austin, 2013; West Virginia University, 2012). Additional information was extracted from 
semi-structured interviews with a convenient sample of at least one PI and/or laboratory 
manager for each type of laboratory. The interviews consisted of questions concerning the 
general structure of individual laboratories, the associated risks and safety policies, practices, 
and procedures. Once the measures were developed, they were also reviewed by some of the 
PIs and their lab members for accuracy and completeness. 
The nine general safety climate items from Beus et al. (2013) in Appendix A were 
modified for each contextualized measure. The items were initially identified based on their 
ambiguity and conduciveness to contextualization. For example, a management commitment 
item that was not chosen reads, “My supervisor is committed to improving safety.” This item 
can involve a variety of potential practices that are not specific to a particular type of 
laboratory or work setting. The item, “My supervisor [laboratory manager/PI] strictly 
enforces the safe working procedures in my workgroup” was chosen because it is somewhat 
less ambiguous and allows for differentiation across laboratory type. How well the items 
loaded on their corresponding factor/dimension across two samples in Beus et al. (2013) was 
also considered. 
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Two additional items were chosen from the management commitment and safety 
equipment & housekeeping dimensions. An additional item was included from the 
management commitment dimension because of the importance of this dimension to safety 
climate. Two items from the equipment & housekeeping dimension were included because 
this dimension addresses two clearly distinct issues: equipment and housekeeping. 
Correspondingly, one item was chosen to represent each issue. 
Items were contextualized to include safety cues relevant to each particular type of 
laboratory. Cues applicable to the particular domain and item follow each item. For example, 
the general item “equipment in my work area is checked to make sure it is free of faults” was 
altered in the animal biological laboratory measure to “Equipment in my lab is checked to 
make sure it is free of faults (a list of some of the equipment that is likely to be in your lab is 
provided below).” A list of equipment in order of applicability is then provided in bulleted 
form. Contextualized measures appear in Appendices B-G. The coefficient alphas for the six 
contextualized measures are as follows: animal biological (.90), biological (.89), chemical 
(.91), mechanical/electrical (.90), human subjects/office (.94), and generic (.82). 
 Self-report safety knowledge, behavior, and safety-related events. Participants 
completed Griffin and Neal’s (2000) measures of safety knowledge, compliance, and 
participation (Appendix H). Each measure consists of four items responded to on a 5-point 
agreement scale. Coefficient alphas were .92, .93, and .89 respectively.  
Respondents also provided individual safety incident data (Appendix H). Three items 
were used to assess the number of injuries, incidents, and near misses in the last 12 months. 
 Perceived job risk. Participants completed a measure of perceived job risk (Jermier 
Gaines, & McIntosh, 1989). The measure consists of three items that are responded to on a 5-
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point Likert scale ranging from almost always untrue to almost always true (Appendix H). 
The coefficient alpha for the measure of perceived job risk in the current study was .87. 
Analyses 
 Hypothesis testing. Both hypotheses were tested using an updated version of 
Steiger’s Z for determining the significance of the difference between dependent correlations 
(Hoerger, 2013; Steiger, 1980). Hypothesis 1 stated that a contextualized safety climate 
measure has a stronger positive relationship with self-reported safety knowledge and 
behavior than a general safety climate measure. This hypothesis is supported if the 
correlations between a contextualized safety climate measure and safety knowledge, 
participation, and compliance are significantly greater than the relationships with a general 
safety climate measure. This hypothesis was tested for each of the contextualized safety 
climate measures except for the generic, uncategorized measure.  
Hypothesis 2 stated that a contextualized safety climate measure has a stronger 
negative relationship with self-reported injuries, incidents, and near misses than a general 
safety climate measure. This hypothesis is supported if the correlations between a 
contextualized safety climate measure and injuries, incidents, and near misses are 
significantly greater than the relationships with a general safety climate measure. This 
hypothesis is tested for each of the contextualized safety climate measures except for the 
generic, uncategorized measure.  
The current study also provides an initial analysis of the conduciveness of safety 
climate dimensions to contextualization (Research Question 1). The relationships between 
contextualized and general measures at the item-level and the various safety-related variables 
were also analyzed using Steiger’s Z. 
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Additional analyses. Independent t-tests were used to test the significance of the 
difference in job-risk, injuries, incidents, and near misses between the five laboratory types. 
A Mann-Whitney test was also used to test the significance of the difference in the biosafety 
level of biological and animal biological respondents.   
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3. RESULTS 
 
Testing for Order Effects 
 As noted earlier, the two safety climate measures were counterbalanced such that 
approximately half of the respondents (n = 387) received the general safety climate measure 
first followed by the contextualized safety climate measure and the other half of the 
respondents (n = 370) received the contextualized safety climate measure first followed by 
the general safety climate measure. An initial analysis was conducted to determine if the 
order in which the participants responded to the safety climate measures influenced the 
scores on these measures. A multivariate analysis of variance indicated that order did not 
have a significant effect on the contextualized safety climate scores, F(1, 642) = .10, p = .75, 
η2 < .001, nor the general safety climate scores, F(1, 642) = .01, p = .91, η2 < .001.  
 An additional analysis was conducted to more definitely determine if there were any 
order effects by examining the influence of order on the difference between the two safety 
climate assessments (Contextualized – General). An analysis of variance indicated that order 
did not have a significant effect on the difference between contextualized and general safety 
climate measures for animal biological, F(1, 178) = .10, p = .75, η2 = .001, chemical, F(1, 
105) = .47, p = .49, η2 = .004, mechanical/electrical, F(1, 54) = 1.51, p = .23, η2 = .03, and 
human subjects/office laboratory members, F(1, 104) = 1.35, p = .25, η2 = .01. However, 
order did have a significant effect on the difference between safety climate measures for 
biological laboratory respondents, F(1, 184) = 7.71, p = .006, η2 = .04. There was greater 
difference between measures when the general measure was completed first (d = -.10, n = 93) 
compared to the contextualized biological measure (d = .04, n = 93). Biology lab respondents 
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tended to rate general safety climate higher than contextualized safety climate when they 
completed the general measure first compared to those who completed the contextualized 
biological measure first. It appears that reading contextualized items after general items led 
biological respondents to rate safety climate lower. 
Comparisons with Previous Findings 
General patterns of the relationships between variables in the current study are in in-
line with previous meta-analytic results. Christian et al. (2009) meta-analyzed the 
relationship between safety climate and safety knowledge (ρ = .24). In the current study, the 
relationship between safety climate and knowledge was a bit stronger, ranging from .41 
to .67. Christian et al. (2009) also analyzed the relationship between safety climate and safety 
behavior (participation: ρ  = .59, compliance ρ  = .48). Consistent with these values, the 
relationship in the current study between safety climate and participation ranged from .45 
to .71; the relationship between safety climate and compliance ranged from .45 to .73. The 
correlation between accidents and injury rates and psychological safety climate ranged from 
-.14 to -.24 across three previous meta-analyses (Beus et al., 2010; Christian et al., 2009; 
Nahrgang et al., 2011). In the current study, the relationships between safety climate and 
each of the following: near misses, incidents, and injuries, ranged from -.01 to -.42.  
Hypothesis Testing 
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations of all study variables for five of the 
contextualized measures are reported in Tables 4 through 8. Tables 9 and 10 and Figures 2 
through 6 present the correlations between safety predictors and safety climate, facilitating a 
comparison of results obtained with contextualized and general safety climate measures. In 
Table 11 and Figures 7 and 8, results are presented aggregating across laboratory types. 
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Results for the generic safety climate measure are not provided because of a small sample 
size (n = 11). The generic measure was developed exclusively for those respondents who 
work in an uncategorized laboratory type. 
Animal biological laboratory. The general and contextualized safety climate 
measures for animal biological laboratories were highly related (r = .80, n =180, p < .001). 
Hypothesis 1 was not supported for the animal biological measure. Although in the expected 
direction, the correlation between contextualized safety climate and safety knowledge (r 
= .44) and the correlation between general safety climate and knowledge were not 
significantly different (r = .41), Z(180) = .71, p = .48. The same was true for safety 
compliance (r = .47 vs. r = .45), Z(180) = .48, p = .63. The correlations with safety 
participation were opposite of the predicted direction, but not significantly different from one 
another (r = .45 vs. r = .51), Z(180) = -1.46, p = .14.  
Hypothesis 2 was not supported for the animal biological measure. The 
contextualized and general safety climate correlations with near misses (r = -.22 vs. r = -.15), 
Z(180) = -1.50, p = .13, incidents (r = -.14 vs. r = -.10), Z(180) = -.85, p = .40, and injuries (r 
= -.20 vs. r = -.15), Z(180) = -1.07, p = .28, were not significantly different from one another, 
despite being in the expected direction. 
Biological laboratory. The two safety climate measures were significantly related to 
one another for biological laboratories (r = .84, n = 186, p < .001). Contrary to the 
Hypothesis 1, the contextualized safety climate measure had a significantly weaker  
relationship with safety compliance compared to the general measure (r = .52 vs. r = .61), 
Z(186) = -2.68, p = .007. Relationships between the following safety variables and safety  
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Table 4 
Animal Biological Laboratory Descriptive Statistics and Inter-correlations 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Safety knowledge 4.55 0.52 (.92)          
2. Safety participation  4.18 0.69 .63** (.89)         
3. Safety compliance 4.47 0.59 .72** .63** (.93)        
4. Injuries 0.33 1.12 -.03 -.04 -.07 --       
5. Incidents 0.49 1.40 .01 .02 -.04 .24** --      
6. Near misses 0.72 1.61 .02 -.03 -.17* .09 .26** --     
7. Contextualized safety climate  4.25 0.64 .44** .45** .47** -.15* -.14 -.22** (.90)    
8. General safety climate  4.21 0.77 .41** .51** .45** -.20** -.10 -.15* .80** (.95)   
9. Management commitment (C) 4.28 0.74 .30** .32** .33** -.13 -.11 -.14 .88** .63** (.82)  
10. Management commitment (G) 4.23 0.87 .36** .47** .38** -.19** -.14 -.14 .75** .92** .64** (.93) 
11. Communication (C) 4.31 0.81 .38** .39** .36** -.09 -.13 -.17* .79** .59** .66** .56** 
12. Communication (G) 4.26 0.95 .35** .44** .36** -.17* -.15 -.12 .67** .86** .54** .80** 
13. Training (C) 4.23 0.86 .35** .32** .34** .00 -.02 .06 .71** .52** .58** .47** 
14. Training (G) 4.30 0.85 .37** .41** .36** -.14 -.08 -.02 .64** .83** .45** .75** 
15. Co-worker safety practices (C) 4.21 0.92 .25** .29** .36** -.15 -.22** -.35** .75** .66** .59** .62** 
16. Co-worker safety practices (G) 3.96 1.02 .23** .31** .39** -.22** -.15* -.28** .68** .79** .58** .67** 
17. Equipment & housekeeping (C) 4.37 0.66 .36** .36** .46** -.05 -.05 -.25** .79** .67** .60** .62** 
18. Equipment & housekeeping (G) 4.31 0.80 .39** .46** .46** -.12 .06 -.16* .67** .86** .48** .69** 
19. Involvement (C) 4.27 0.88 .40** .34** .34** -.24** -.10 -.17* .82** .68** .67** .62** 
20. Involvement (G) 4.26 0.88 .42** .52** .38** -.17* -.08 -.05 .73** .91** .57** .82** 
21. Rewards (C) 3.93 1.00 .34** .34** .30** -.20** -.18* -.16* .71** .61** .55** .53** 
22. Rewards (G) 4.03 0.99 .37** .40** .33** -.20** -.12 -.12 .65** .79** .48** .68** 
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Table 4 continued 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
23. Counterbalanced ordera 1.55 0.50 .02 .01 -.10 -.01 -.06 .09 -.02 -.05 -.01 .00 
24. Animal biosafety level 1.67 0.59 .16 .13 .12 -.01 -.10 .00 .07 .13 -.03 .08 
25. Job risk 1.86 0.83 -.17* -.06 -.27** .19* .07 .10 -.28** -.26** -.19* -.19* 
26. Positionb 2.90 2.08 .16* .23** .11 .14 .10 .19* -.05 .05 -.05 .06 
27. Tenure (months) 45.07 78.91 .19* .22** .16* .24** .17* .16 .11 .14 .07 .15 
28. Number of lab members 11.32 11.05 .05 .12 .07 .10 .08 .34** -.05 -.04 -.01 .01 
29. Sexc 1.69 0.46 .03 .16* .18* .07 .08 .02 .04 .04 .07 .05 
30. Age 30.17 13.20 .21** .21** .16* .13 .21** .12 .00 .06 -.04 .07 
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Table 4 continued 
Variable M SD 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
11. Communication (C) 4.31 0.81 --          
12. Communication (G) 4.26 0.95 .61** --         
13. Training (C) 4.23 0.86 .62** .41** --        
14. Training (G) 4.30 0.85 .47** .63** .54** --       
15. Co-worker safety practices (C) 4.21 0.92 .49** .55** .28** .48** --      
16. Co-worker safety practices (G) 3.96 1.02 .38** .57** .37** .58** .65** --     
17. Equipment & housekeeping (C) 4.37 0.66 .58** .49** .53** .61** .61** .55** (.75)    
18. Equipment & housekeeping (G) 4.31 0.80 .48** .67** .59** .69** .55** .72** .71** (.85)   
19. Involvement (C) 4.27 0.88 .61** .61** .50** .48** .57** .54** .50** .50** --  
20. Involvement (G) 4.26 0.88 .57** .80** .42** .75** .59** .63** .54** .71** .68** -- 
21. Rewards (C) 3.93 1.00 .46** .49** .39** .41** .49** .54** .37** .42** .66** .61** 
22. Rewards (G) 4.03 0.99 .48** .69** .30** .57** .47** .55** .42** .57** .65** .78** 
23. Counterbalanced ordera 1.55 0.50 .09 .02 .00 -.12 -.03 -.16* -.16* -.11 .00 .01 
24. Animal biosafety level 1.67 0.59 .09 .06 .16 .22* -.02 .09 .18* .16 .04 .07 
25. Job risk 1.86 0.83 -.23** -.20** -.16* -.24** -.21** -.30** -.25** -.24** -.36** -.20** 
26. Positionb 2.90 2.08 -.01 .08 .02 .12 -.11 -.13 .06 .07 -.12 .05 
27. Tenure (months) 45.07 78.91 .13 .16* .04 .10 .03 .03 .12 .12 .13 .17* 
28. Number of lab members 11.32 11.05 -.09 .02 .06 .04 -.06 -.12 .06 -.03 -.10 -.03 
29. Sexc 1.69 0.46 .08 .05 .07 .02 .02 .01 .05 .07 -.06 .03 
30. Age 30.17 13.20 .00 .07 .01 .05 -.04 -.03 .04 .09 .03 .08 
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Table 4 continued 
Variable M SD 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
21. Rewards (C) 3.93 1.00 --         
22. Rewards (G) 4.03 0.99 .69** --        
23. Counterbalanced ordera 1.55 0.50 .05 .06 --       
24. Animal biosafety level 1.67 0.59 .05 .10 -.01 --      
25. Job risk 1.86 0.83 -.25** -.24** .13 -.06 --     
26. Positionb 2.90 2.08 -.09 -.01 -.05 .04 .09 --    
27. Tenure (months) 45.07 78.91 .10 .08 -.09 -.08 .02 .44** --   
28. Number of lab members 11.32 11.05 -.20** -.12 .07 .13 .17* .19* -.02 --  
29. Sexd 1.69 0.46 -.07 -.02 -.18* -.07 -.04 .01 -.15 .06 -- 
30. Age 30.17 13.20 .00 .03 .00 .02 .03 .67** .77** .03 -.18* 
Notes. n = 212; Reliabilities (coefficient alphas) appear on the diagonal except management commitment and equipment & housekeeping, which are two 
item correlations; C = contextualized safety climate, G = general safety climate; a 1 = contextualized-general, 2 = general-contextualized; b 1 = undergraduate 
student, 2 = graduate student, 3 = post-doc, 4 = lab manager, 5 = research scientist, 6 = research associate, 7 = principal investigator, 8 = other; c 1 = male, 2 
= female; * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01 
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climate were also opposite of expectations with general being stronger than contextual, but 
statistically equivalent: safety knowledge (r = .41 vs. r = .47), Z(186) = -1.62, p = .11, and 
participation  (r = .48 vs. r = .53), Z(186) = -1.41, p = .16. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was not 
supported for the biological measure. 
Hypothesis 2 was not supported for the biological measure, either. However, as 
predicted, the contextualized safety climate measure had a stronger relationship with near 
misses (r = -.35 vs. r = -.28), Z(186) = -1.78 p = .08. The relationship between contextualized 
and general safety climate and incidents (r = -.21 vs. r = -.16), Z(186) = -1.22, p = .22, and 
injuries (r = -.28 vs. r = -.24), Z(186) = -.99, p = .32, were also supportive of prediction, but 
statistically equivalent. 
Chemical laboratory. For chemical laboratories, the contextualized and general 
safety climate measures were strongly related (r = .86, n = 107, p < .001). Contextualized and 
general safety climate correlations with safety knowledge were equivalent (r = .52 vs. r 
= .52), Z(107) = .00, p = 1.0. Correlations for participation and compliance were opposite of 
the hypothesized direction, but statistically equivalent (r = .49 vs. r = .51), Z(107) = -.45, p 
= .65, and (r = .55 vs. r = .57), Z(107) = -.47, p = .64, respectively. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was 
not supported for the chemical measure. 
Contrary to expectation, the general safety climate measure was more strongly related 
to near misses (r = -.33) than the contextualized measure (r = -.31), Z(107) = .41, p = .68; 
however, the correlations were not significantly different. Although in the expected direction, 
correlations with incidents (r = -.21 vs. r = -.17), Z(107) = -.79, p = .43, and injuries (r = -.21 
vs. r = -.17), Z(107) = -.79, p = .43 were equivalent. Hypothesis 2 was not supported for the 
chemical measure.  
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Table 5 
Biological Laboratory Descriptive Statistics and Inter-correlations 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Safety knowledge 4.51 0.58 (.93)          
2. Safety participation  4.15 0.67 .65** (.89)         
3. Safety compliance 4.43 0.64 .74** .66** (.94)        
4. Injuries 0.18 0.67 -.09 -.06 -.18* --       
5. Incidents 0.26 0.74 .07 -.04 -.10 .22** --      
6. Near misses 0.58 1.53 -.03 -.14 -.29** .18* .36** --     
7. Contextualized safety climate  4.27 0.57 .41** .48** .52** -.28** -.21** -.35** (.89)    
8. General safety climate  4.30 0.64 .47** .53** .61** -.24** -.16* -.28** .84** (.93)   
9. Management commitment (C) 4.38 0.66 .31** .38** .46** -.12 -.18* -.31** .81** .74** (.79)  
10. Management commitment (G) 4.37 0.73 .40** .47** .54** -.18* -.18* -.30** .75** .90** .76** (.89) 
11. Communication (C) 4.39 0.72 .34** .40** .38** -.09 -.16* -.21** .75** .63** .64** .54** 
12. Communication (G) 4.41 0.73 .35** .42** .43** -.14 -.11 -.19** .62** .83** .61** .70** 
13. Training (C) 4.14 0.87 .37** .36** .33** -.14 -.05 -.10 .69** .59** .47** .48** 
14. Training (G) 4.37 0.74 .46** .43** .50** -.08 -.07 -.14* .67** .82** .62** .69** 
15. Co-worker safety practices (C) 4.29 0.86 .23** .26** .32** -.37** -.21** -.33** .70** .53** .42** .38** 
16. Co-worker safety practices (G) 4.06 0.85 .33** .33** .46** -.39** -.21** -.33** .70** .78** .53** .63** 
17. Equipment & housekeeping (C) 4.39 0.66 .34** .37** .47** -.39** -.14 -.38** .84** .67** .57** .57** 
18. Equipment & housekeeping (G) 4.36 0.68 .42** .47** .55** -.35** -.10 -.27** .76** .87** .58** .68** 
19. Involvement (C) 4.34 0.70 .27** .35** .33** -.08 -.14 -.19** .76** .66** .61** .63** 
20. Involvement (G) 4.35 0.74 .41** .45** .51** -.08 -.03 -.12 .65** .82** .64** .77** 
21. Rewards (C) 3.78 1.05 .31** .44** .36** -.20** -.21** -.22** .72** .60** .47** .52** 
22. Rewards (G) 4.05 0.96 .37** .46** .49** -.11 -.20** -.18* .68** .78** .54** .63** 
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Table 5 continued 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
23. Counterbalanced ordera 1.53 0.50 -.01 .08 .03 .09 -.06 .05 .01 .11 .09 .13 
24. Biosafety level 1.62 0.51 .14 .19* .09 .07 .13 .12 .09 .05 .08 .07 
25. Job risk 1.60 0.71 -.10 -.08 -.18* .26** .22** .19** -.35** -.31** -.31** -.32** 
26. Positionb 2.99 2.05 .04 .11 .03 -.16* -.19* -.02 .06 .09 .08 .07 
27. Tenure (months) 51.54 83.37 .00 .08 -.07 -.04 -.11 -.02 .00 .05 .00 .03 
28. Number of lab members 9.66 8.82 -.15* -.08 -.11 .23** -.04 .19* -.08 -.10 -.06 -.04 
29. Sexc 1.58 0.50 .03 .03 .16* -.03 -.08 .02 -.01 -.02 -.01 -.05 
30. Age 33.05 14.55 .03 .17* .04 -.12 -.20** -.04 .04 .09 .06 .08 
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Table 5 continued 
Variable M SD 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
11. Communication (C) 4.39 0.72 --          
12. Communication (G) 4.41 0.73 .54** --         
13. Training (C) 4.14 0.87 .53** .44** --        
14. Training (G) 4.37 0.74 .56** .69** .57** --       
15. Co-worker safety practices (C) 4.29 0.86 .44** .32** .39** .38** --      
16. Co-worker safety practices (G) 4.06 0.85 .51** .58** .45** .59** .64** --     
17. Equipment & housekeeping (C) 4.39 0.66 .52** .42** .49** .50** .66** .64** (.73)    
18. Equipment & housekeeping (G) 4.36 0.68 .50** .65** .54** .67** .58** .70** .75** (.78)   
19. Involvement (C) 4.34 0.70 .55** .59** .49** .49** .36** .43** .52** .50** --  
20. Involvement (G) 4.35 0.74 .55** .71** .53** .65** .31** .50** .41** .59** .58** -- 
21. Rewards (C) 3.78 1.05 .43** .38** .39** .40** .40** .44** .51** .52** .56** .45** 
22. Rewards (G) 4.05 0.96 .47** .61** .44** .56** .38** .51** .47** .62** .56** .64** 
23. Counterbalanced ordera 1.53 0.50 .00 .15* -.01 .09 -.07 -.02 -.07 .03 .01 .09 
24. Biosafety level 1.62 0.51 .09 -.04 .08 .04 .00 -.01 .07 .04 .05 .07 
25. Job risk 1.60 0.71 -.25** -.26** -.22** -.20** -.32** -.33** -.28** -.26** -.19** -.23** 
26. Positionb 2.99 2.05 .05 .14 .12 .11 .08 .04 .02 .10 .09 .10 
27. Tenure (months) 51.54 83.37 .00 .12 .01 .08 .04 .04 -.04 .03 .01 .01 
28. Number of lab members 9.66 8.82 .01 -.10 -.01 -.04 -.12 -.19* -.15* -.13 -.02 -.01 
29. Sexc 1.58 0.50 -.02 -.03 .10 .01 .06 -.02 -.04 .00 -.04 .06 
30. Age 33.05 14.55 .03 .12 .06 .07 .06 .04 -.02 .08 .06 .11 
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Table 5 continued 
Variable M SD 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
21. Rewards (C) 3.78 1.05 --         
22. Rewards (G) 4.05 0.96 .72** --        
23. Counterbalanced ordera 1.53 0.50 .05 .17* --       
24. Biosafety level 1.62 0.51 .08 .08 -.02 --      
25. Job risk 1.60 0.71 -.22** -.19** .04 .03 (.82)     
26. Positionb 2.99 2.05 -.07 -.04 -.02 -.07 -.04 --    
27. Tenure (months) 51.54 83.37 .03 -.03 .10 -.19* -.05 .55** --   
28. Number of lab members 9.66 8.82 -.02 -.05 -.11 .20* .11 -.06 -.17* --  
29. Sexc 1.58 0.50 -.04 -.02 -.01 .17* .03 -.10 -.06 .06 -- 
30. Age 33.05 14.55 -.01 .01 .02 -.08 -.01 .82** .68** -.08 -.08 
Notes. n = 219; Reliabilities (coefficient alphas) appear on the diagonal except management commitment and equipment & housekeeping, which are two 
item correlations; C = contextualized safety climate, G = general safety climate; a 1 = contextualized-general, 2 = general-contextualized; b 1 = undergraduate 
student, 2 = graduate student, 3 = post-doc, 4 = lab manager, 5 = research scientist, 6 = research associate, 7 = principal investigator, 8 = other; c 1 = male, 2 
= female; * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01 
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Table 6 
Chemical Laboratory Descriptive Statistics and Inter-correlations 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Safety knowledge 4.44 0.54 (.90)          
2. Safety participation  4.14 0.67 .51** (.87)         
3. Safety compliance 4.29 0.63 .66** .60** (.91)        
4. Injuries 0.56 2.63 -.13 -.10 -.09 --       
5. Incidents 0.86 2.67 -.12 -.11 -.09 .77** --      
6. Near misses 1.19 2.80 -.13 -.15 -.19 .57** .67** --     
7. Contextualized safety climate  4.10 0.69 .52** .49** .55** -.21* -.21* -.31** (.91)    
8. General safety climate  4.10 0.73 .52** .51** .57** -.17 -.17 -.33** .86** (.92)   
9. Management commitment (C) 4.11 0.94 .43** .38** .49** -.18 -.18 -.26** .84** .72** (.86)  
10. Management commitment (G) 4.20 0.87 .47** .47** .54** -.03 -.06 -.25** .80** .90** .75** (.90) 
11. Communication (C) 4.27 0.77 .49** .48** .44** -.22* -.18 -.29** .74** .64** .62** .65** 
12. Communication (G) 4.27 0.87 .56** .53** .47** -.18 -.15 -.27** .70** .79** .52** .73** 
13. Training (C) 4.06 0.91 .49** .35** .41** -.14 -.21* -.23* .79** .70** .59** .62** 
14. Training (G) 4.03 0.96 .54** .37** .47** -.17 -.21* -.29** .74** .81** .65** .69** 
15. Co-worker safety practices (C) 4.06 0.95 .31** .25** .34** -.11 -.13 -.25* .72** .61** .52** .56** 
16. Co-worker safety practices (G) 3.72 1.06 .29** .32** .42** -.21* -.17 -.24* .56** .71** .52** .57** 
17. Equipment & housekeeping (C) 4.15 0.75 .42** .36** .40** -.19 -.19 -.32** .79** .64** .49** .52** 
18. Equipment & housekeeping (G) 4.11 0.76 .42** .37** .47** -.16 -.15 -.36** .74** .87** .57** .68** 
19. Involvement (C) 4.12 0.93 .43** .48** .49** -.19 -.19 -.26** .85** .79** .76** .75** 
20. Involvement (G) 4.20 0.94 .43** .48** .41** -.15 -.18 -.26** .67** .78** .53** .62** 
21. Rewards (C) 3.80 1.01 .30** .40** .38** -.14 -.09 -.11 .67** .63** .44** .54** 
22. Rewards (G) 4.05 0.98 .25** .37** .41** -.16 -.10 -.17 .61** .75** .44** .64** 
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Table 6 continued 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
23. Counterbalanced ordera 1.47 0.50 .06 .09 .02 .13 .07 .18 .07 .11 .07 .14 
24. Chemical safety level 1.94 0.97 .31 .23 .27 .25 .07 .43 -.29 -.10 -.47 .07 
25. Job risk 1.99 0.94 -.06 .01 -.14 .07 .19* .10 -.33** -.27** -.22* -.27** 
26. Positionb 2.78 1.83 .20* .36** .20* -.11 -.14 -.17 .20* .21* .06 .20* 
27. Tenure (months) 43.00 68.20 .20* .27** .13 -.06 -.07 -.09 .09 .13 -.08 .13 
28. Number of lab members 10.64 8.52 .00 -.18 .04 -.03 -.03 -.10 -.10 -.08 -.01 -.05 
29. Sexc 1.44 0.50 .05 .07 .15 -.02 -.13 -.13 .00 .02 .04 .03 
30. Age 30.97 12.95 .26** .33** .20* -.09 -.12 -.11 .14 .17 -.05 .18 
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Table 6 continued 
Variable M SD 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
11. Communication (C) 4.39 0.72 --          
12. Communication (G) 4.41 0.73 .72** --         
13. Training (C) 4.14 0.87 .57** .61** --        
14. Training (G) 4.37 0.74 .53** .62** .67** --       
15. Co-worker safety practices (C) 4.29 0.86 .40** .40** .51** .60** --      
16. Co-worker safety practices (G) 4.06 0.85 .28** .28** .38** .56** .51** --     
17. Equipment & housekeeping (C) 4.39 0.66 .49** .49** .60** .54** .57** .42** (.75)    
18. Equipment & housekeeping (G) 4.36 0.68 .52** .64** .60** .66** .52** .67** .69** (.72)   
19. Involvement (C) 4.34 0.70 .70** .79** .63** .59** .46** .39** .62** .64** --  
20. Involvement (G) 4.35 0.74 .50** .64** .65** .65** .40** .43** .51** .62** .67** -- 
21. Rewards (C) 3.78 1.05 .38** .43** .44** .49** .41** .44** .48** .47** .56** .44** 
22. Rewards (G) 4.05 0.96 .41** .60** .39** .46** .41** .46** .38** .55** .64** .58** 
23. Counterbalanced ordera 1.53 0.50 -.06 .15 .06 .09 -.07 -.09 .01 .04 .15 .14 
24. Chemical safety level 1.94 0.97 -.14 -.13 -.16 -.19 -.32 -.27 .09 -.10 -.19 -.14 
25. Job risk 1.60 0.71 -.21* -.16 -.31** -.18 -.21* -.19* -.33** -.24* -.33** -.19* 
26. Positionb 2.99 2.05 .16 .23* .10 .18 .11 .07 .23* .17 .27** .18 
27. Tenure (months) 51.54 83.37 .09 .22* .12 .07 .07 -.02 .09 .10 .11 .11 
28. Number of lab members 9.66 8.82 .07 .01 -.02 -.02 -.16 -.12 -.12 -.03 -.12 -.12 
29. Sexc 1.58 0.50 .04 -.08 -.11 -.03 .03 .13 -.05 .02 -.02 -.06 
30. Age 33.05 14.55 .19 .23* .12 .12 .13 .02 .11 .12 .15 .12 
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Table 6 continued 
Variable M SD 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
21. Rewards (C) 3.78 1.05 --         
22. Rewards (G) 4.05 0.96 .74** --        
23. Counterbalanced ordera 1.53 0.50 .19 .20* --       
24. Chemical safety level 1.94 0.97 -.14 .19 .10 --      
25. Job risk 1.60 0.71 -.23* -.26** -.10 -.05 (.86)     
26. Positionb 2.99 2.05 .27** .17 -.04 -.26 -.03 --    
27. Tenure (months) 51.54 83.37 .24* .15 -.06 .03 .09 .50** --   
28. Number of lab members 9.66 8.82 -.24* -.14 -.13 .41 .00 -.10 -.13 --  
29. Sexc 1.58 0.50 .03 .04 .09 -.18 -.13 -.07 -.17 -.07 -- 
30. Age 33.05 14.55 .27** .16 -.14 -.06 .02 .77** .76** -.14 -.20 
Notes. n = 124; Reliabilities (coefficient alphas) appear on the diagonal except management commitment and equipment & housekeeping, which are two 
item correlations; C = contextualized safety climate, G = general safety climate; a 1 = contextualized-general, 2 = general-contextualized; b 1 = undergraduate 
student, 2 = graduate student, 3 = post-doc, 4 = lab manager, 5 = research scientist, 6 = research associate, 7 = principal investigator, 8 = other; c 1 = male, 2 
= female; * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01 
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Mechanical/electrical laboratory. The relationship between safety climate measures 
was strong for mechanical/electrical laboratories (r = .70, n = 56, p < .001).  
Contextualized and general safety climate measure correlations were the opposite of 
expectation, but statistically equivalent for the following variables: safety knowledge (r = .64 
vs. r = .67), Z(56) = -.40, p = .69, participation (r = .63 vs. r = .71), Z(56) = -1.09, p = .28, 
and compliance (r = .66 vs. r = .73), Z(56) = -.99, p = .32. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was not 
supported for the mechanical/electrical measure. 
Hypothesis 2 was not supported for the mechanical/electrical measure, either. 
Contextualized and general safety climate correlations with near misses, incidents, and 
injuries were statistically equivalent: near misses (r = -.12 vs. r = -.10), Z(56) = -.19, p = .85, 
incidents (r = -.08 vs. r = -.12), Z(56) = .38, p = .71, and injuries (r = -.01 vs. r = -.12), Z(56) 
= 1.04, p = .30.  
Human subjects/office laboratory. Results for human subjects/office laboratories 
indicated that the safety climate measures were significantly related (r = .66, n = 106, p 
< .001); however, this relationship was the weakest of the five laboratory types. Hypothesis 1 
was partially supported for the human subjects/office measure. Compared to the general 
safety climate measure, the contextualized safety climate measure had a significantly 
stronger relationship with safety knowledge (r = .62 vs. r = .43), Z(106) = 2.89, p = .004. 
Correlation comparisons with safety participation (r = .59 vs. r = .47), Z(106) = 1.82, p = .07, 
and compliance (r = .64 vs. r = .53), Z(106) = 1.76, p = .08 were in the expected direction, 
but not statistically different. 
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Table 7 
Mechanical/Electrical Laboratory Descriptive Statistics and Inter-correlations 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Safety knowledge 4.31 0.58 (.93)          
2. Safety participation  4.14 0.62 .66** (.89)         
3. Safety compliance 4.24 0.58 .89** .64** (.92)        
4. Injuries 0.38 0.97 -.08 .06 -.05 --       
5. Incidents 0.91 3.48 -.06 -.03 -.03 .19 --      
6. Near misses 0.78 1.80 .06 .12 .02 .44** .19 --     
7. Contextualized safety climate  4.11 0.57 .64** .63** .66** -.01 -.08 -.12 (.90)    
8. General safety climate  4.06 0.67 .67** .71** .73** -.12 -.12 -.10 .70** (.95)   
9. Management commitment (C) 4.24 0.74 .53** .47** .52** .02 .05 -.12 .88** .62** (.84)  
10. Management commitment (G) 4.17 0.74 .66** .61** .69** -.07 -.01 .01 .61** .91** .55** (.94) 
11. Communication (C) 4.12 0.77 .39** .38** .45** .00 -.02 -.13 .81** .57** .82** .52** 
12. Communication (G) 4.04 0.83 .46** .68** .53** -.04 -.08 -.07 .53** .85** .50** .76** 
13. Training (C) 4.02 0.71 .49** .45** .50** .06 -.04 -.06 .71** .43** .54** .33* 
14. Training (G) 4.02 0.82 .57** .51** .63** -.14 -.09 -.19 .56** .82** .50** .68** 
15. Co-worker safety practices (C) 4.07 0.78 .24 .50** .31* .13 -.12 -.03 .63** .36** .43** .32* 
16. Co-worker safety practices (G) 3.86 0.84 .50** .57** .58** -.22 -.30* -.20 .56** .85** .42** .76** 
17. Equipment & housekeeping (C) 4.22 0.60 .62** .55** .62** -.11 -.13 -.22 .86** .58** .69** .46** 
18. Equipment & housekeeping (G) 4.09 0.67 .64** .68** .73** -.05 -.08 -.10 .70** .91** .64** .77** 
19. Involvement (C) 4.04 0.78 .63** .66** .63** .03 -.14 .06 .82** .69** .63** .62** 
20. Involvement (G) 4.02 0.84 .45** .59** .52** -.16 .03 -.16 .62** .85** .59** .71** 
21. Rewards (C) 3.95 0.81 .56** .51** .58** -.13 -.11 -.11 .68** .60** .44** .52** 
22. Rewards (G) 4.07 0.83 .62** .61** .57** -.08 -.28* .05 .60** .77** .45** .68** 
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Table 7 continued 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
23. Counterbalanced ordera 1.51 0.50 -.23 -.03 -.23 .29* -.05 .26* .00 -.13 .01 -.09 
24. Job risk 1.82 0.90 -.04 .23 -.14 .26 .09 .23 .02 -.03 .05 -.02 
25. Positionb 2.76 1.83 .01 .05 -.04 -.13 .31* .04 -.10 -.19 -.05 -.20 
26. Tenure (months) 29.98 39.37 .21 .13 .13 -.08 .00 .08 .07 .07 .01 .08 
27. Number of lab members 9.31 6.52 .15 .19 .28* .05 .00 .19 .18 .26 .07 .30* 
28. Sexc 1.20 0.41 -.11 -.07 -.08 .12 .42** .02 -.18 -.24 -.19 -.21 
29. Age 30.35 12.89 .17 .15 .07 -.16 -.06 .07 .00 .03 -.04 .04 
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Table 7 continued 
Variable M SD 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
11. Communication (C) 4.12 0.77 --          
12. Communication (G) 4.04 0.83 .51** --         
13. Training (C) 4.02 0.71 .47** .35** --        
14. Training (G) 4.02 0.82 .43** .77** .48** --       
15. Co-worker safety practices (C) 4.07 0.78 .37** .20 .39** .11 --      
16. Co-worker safety practices (G) 3.86 0.84 .37** .66** .29* .69** .43** --     
17. Equipment & housekeeping (C) 4.22 0.60 .55** .37** .55** .53** .50** .49** (.70)    
18. Equipment & housekeeping (G) 4.09 0.67 .54** .71** .41** .72** .39** .73** .61** (.74)   
19. Involvement (C) 4.04 0.78 .71** .61** .56** .55** .45** .52** .65** .62** --  
20. Involvement (G) 4.02 0.84 .56** .68** .38** .63** .28* .60** .51** .80** .57** -- 
21. Rewards (C) 3.95 0.81 .41** .38** .41** .44** .39** .60** .55** .57** .54** .48** 
22. Rewards (G) 4.07 0.83 .45** .53** .38** .48** .37** .67** .47** .64** .64** .65** 
23. Counterbalanced ordera 1.51 0.50 -.02 -.13 -.02 -.20 .09 -.12 -.19 -.11 .00 -.15 
24. Job risk 1.82 0.90 .12 .13 .02 -.14 .14 -.18 -.12 .02 .08 -.01 
25. Positionb 2.76 1.83 -.07 -.14 .12 -.07 -.08 -.21 -.05 -.15 -.19 -.09 
26. Tenure (months) 29.98 39.37 .01 .01 .20 .13 .10 .09 .05 .03 .04 .03 
27. Number of lab members 9.31 6.52 .14 .24 .22 .24 .06 .24 .11 .15 .30* .19 
28 Sexc 1.20 0.41 -.20 -.20 -.17 -.18 -.13 -.26 -.02 -.21 -.22 -.06 
29. Age 30.35 12.89 -.07 .02 .19 .03 .10 .09 .07 -.01 -.06 .01 
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Table 7 continued 
Variable M SD 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
21. Rewards (C) 3.95 0.81 --        
22. Rewards (G) 4.07 0.83 .64** --       
23. Counterbalanced ordera 1.51 0.50 .15 .00 --      
24. Job risk 1.82 0.90 -.13 -.03 .10 (.87)     
25. Positionb 2.76 1.83 -.25 -.26 -.13 .13 --    
26. Tenure (months) 29.98 39.37 .03 .08 -.21 .23 .44** --   
27. Number of lab members 9.31 6.52 .18 .24 .14 -.16 -.13 -.18 --  
28. Sexc 1.20 0.41 -.12 -.33* -.14 .10 .08 -.06 -.07 -- 
29. Age 30.35 12.89 -.17 .00 -.24 .15 .71** .70** -.14 -.12 
Notes. n = 65; Reliabilities (coefficient alphas) appear on the diagonal except management commitment and equipment & housekeeping, which are two item 
correlations; C = contextualized safety climate, G = general safety climate; a 1 = contextualized-general, 2 = general-contextualized; b 1 = undergraduate 
student, 2 = graduate student, 3 = post-doc, 4 = lab manager, 5 = research scientist, 6 = research associate, 7 = principal investigator, 8 = other; c 1 = male, 2 
= female; * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01 
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Hypothesis 2 was partially supported for the human subjects/office measure. Whereas the 
difference in the correlations between contextualized and general safety climate with incidents (r 
= -.42 vs. r = -.29), Z(106) = -1.74, p = .08 and with near misses was not statistically significant 
(r = -.36, vs. r = -.24), Z(106) = -1.57, p = .12, the difference between the correlations was 
significant for injuries (r = -.34 vs. r = -.13), Z(106) = -2.70, p = .007. 
Overall results and aggregated comparisons. When the data are aggregated across 
contextualized measures (see Table 11 and Figure 7), the contextualized measure consistently 
outperforms the general measure as the magnitude of the correlation is always higher (albeit 
sometimes only slightly) for the contextualized measure. Comparisons of the correlations with 
six predictors as related to contextualized and general safety climate across laboratory types are 
as follows: safety knowledge (.52 vs. .46), participation (.51 vs. .50), and compliance (.54 
vs. .53), and near misses (-.25 vs. -.21), incidents (-.14 vs. -.12), and injuries (-.17 vs. -.15). 
Nevertheless, the only difference that meets statistical significance (p < .05) is the one between 
the relationships with safety knowledge. 
When the data are parsed by laboratory, the pattern of correlations for the human 
subjects/office laboratory almost perfectly mimic the results for the aggregated data (see Table 
11 and Figure 6). Compared to the general measure of safety climate, the human subjects/office 
laboratory measure was the only contextualized measure consistently more strongly related to 
multiple safety predictors: safety knowledge (.62 vs. .43), participation (.59 vs. .47), and 
compliance (.64 vs. .53), near misses (-.36 vs. -.24), incidents (-.42 vs. -.29), and injuries (-.34 
vs. -13). These differences are statistically meaningful for safety knowledge and injuries. The 
only 
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Table 8 
Human Subjects/Office Laboratory Descriptive Statistics and Inter-correlations 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Safety knowledge 4.34 0.70 (.94)          
2. Safety participation  3.93 0.74 .66** (.90)         
3. Safety compliance 4.41 0.68 .84** .59** (.95)        
4. Injuries 0.15 0.66 -.13 -.10 -.20* --       
5. Incidents 0.10 0.43 -.18 -.11 -.26** .65** --      
6. Near misses 0.27 0.84 -.11 -.03 -.14 .38** .48** --     
7. Contextualized safety climate  4.02 0.81 .62** .59** .64** -.34** -.42** -.36** (.94)    
8. General safety climate  3.96 0.94 .43** .47** .53** -.13 -.29** -.24* .66** (.97)   
9. Management commitment (C) 4.10 0.94 .51** .48** .52** -.21* -.33** -.30** .88** .59** (.86)  
10. Management commitment (G) 3.96 1.02 .42** .49** .52** -.14 -.28** -.15 .61** .95** .56** (.96) 
11. Communication (C) 4.01 1.03 .52** .57** .51** -.21* -.23* -.17 .81** .54** .77** .51** 
12. Communication (G) 3.92 1.17 .36** .46** .42** -.04 -.22* -.24* .65** .91** .59** .87** 
13. Training (C) 3.79 1.08 .45** .49** .54** -.23* -.28** -.26** .76** .45** .62** .41** 
14. Training (G) 4.03 1.08 .41** .42** .53** -.06 -.23* -.22* .62** .92** .56** .83** 
15. Co-worker safety practices (C) 3.99 0.91 .55** .50** .51** -.35** -.37** -.47** .79** .52** .57** .43** 
16. Co-worker safety practices (G) 3.96 1.00 .33** .28** .43** -.17 -.27** -.41** .54** .84** .48** .75** 
17. Equipment & housekeeping (C) 4.10 0.85 .52** .45** .54** -.44** -.48** -.35** .84** .51** .59** .46** 
18. Equipment & housekeeping (G) 4.03 0.93 .38** .40** .52** -.17 -.35** -.24* .54** .91** .45** .80** 
19. Involvement (C) 3.99 1.04 .61** .49** .57** -.30** -.39** -.28** .90** .66** .76** .60** 
20. Involvement (G) 3.93 1.06 .42** .46** .48** -.14 -.25* -.22* .65** .94** .59** .87** 
21. Rewards (C) 3.89 1.07 .55** .62** .58** -.21* -.34** -.25** .87** .64** .74** .62** 
22. Rewards (G) 3.84 1.03 .39** .50** .46** -.10 -.19* -.13 .66** .91** .59** .86** 
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Table 8 continued 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
23. Counterbalanced ordera 1.48 0.50 .05 .01 .11 -.12 -.02 -.03 .00 -.06 -.01 .01 
24. Job risk 1.16 0.45 -.09 -.09 -.18 .53** .52** .39** -.23* -.22* -.18 -.18 
25. Positionb 2.48 1.73 -.17 -.14 -.12 -.06 .02 .10 -.10 .01 -.03 .05 
26. Tenure (months) 25.74 43.30 .01 .08 .01 -.10 -.08 .05 .08 .10 .09 .11 
27. Number of lab members 9.61 10.39 -.02 .08 .04 -.03 -.12 -.11 .07 .03 .11 .02 
28. Sexc 1.48 0.50 -.05 .07 -.03 -.01 -.13 .12 -.06 .12 -.10 .11 
29. Age 28.65 10.85 .09 .08 .08 -.04 .07 .06 .02 .01 .05 .04 
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Table 8 continued 
Variable M SD 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
11. Communication (C) 4.01 1.03 --          
12. Communication (G) 3.92 1.17 .58** --         
13. Training (C) 3.79 1.08 .56** .48** --        
14. Training (G) 4.03 1.08 .51** .88** .51** --       
15. Co-worker safety practices (C) 3.99 0.91 .53** .49** .53** .49** --      
16. Co-worker safety practices (G) 3.96 1.00 .36** .68** .27** .71** .51** --     
17. Equipment & housekeeping (C) 4.10 0.85 .56** .43** .57** .45** .71** .49** (.76)    
18. Equipment & housekeeping (G) 4.03 0.93 .40** .73** .37** .83** .46** .80** .48** (.83)   
19. Involvement (C) 3.99 1.04 .68** .64** .59** .61** .72** .56** .75** .55** --  
20. Involvement (G) 3.93 1.06 .53** .85** .44** .84** .52** .75** .50** .83** .68** -- 
21. Rewards (C) 3.89 1.07 .66** .64** .63** .57** .64** .51** .67** .49** .79** .61** 
22. Rewards (G) 3.84 1.03 .59** .83** .44** .79** .47** .72** .47** .76** .65** .84** 
23. Counterbalanced ordera 1.48 0.50 .04 -.07 .05 -.03 -.01 -.08 .01 -.09 -.06 -.07 
24. Job risk 1.16 0.45 -.06 -.18 -.23* -.18 -.27** -.23* -.23* -.23* -.23* -.24* 
25. Positionb 2.48 1.73 -.03 -.01 -.08 .00 -.25** -.02 -.05 .01 -.09 .03 
26. Tenure (months) 25.74 43.30 .10 .06 .00 .11 .03 .05 .11 .10 .10 .10 
27. Number of lab members 9.61 10.39 .05 .04 .00 .00 .06 .09 .07 .05 .03 .01 
28. Sexc 1.48 0.50 .00 .16 -.18 .08 .01 .05 -.02 .12 -.02 .09 
29. Age 28.65 10.85 .07 -.02 -.01 -.01 -.09 .00 .04 .01 .03 .04 
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Table 8 continued 
Variable M SD 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
21. Rewards (C) 3.89 1.07 --        
22. Rewards (G) 3.84 1.03 .69** --       
23. Counterbalanced ordera 1.48 0.50 .05 -.08 --      
24. Job risk 1.16 0.45 -.16 -.13 .01 (.88)     
25. Positionb 2.48 1.73 -.12 -.07 .03 .05 --    
26. Tenure (months) 25.74 43.30 .02 .10 -.06 -.05 .49** --   
27. Number of lab members 9.61 10.39 .07 -.01 -.18 .07 -.04 -.13 --  
28. Sexc 1.48 0.50 -.04 .11 .00 -.10 -.09 -.02 .00 -- 
29. Age 28.65 10.85 -.04 -.01 -.02 .02 .71** .76** -.04 -.16 
Notes. n = 126; Reliabilities (coefficient alphas) appear on the diagonal except management commitment and equipment & housekeeping, which are two 
item correlations; C = contextualized safety climate, G = general safety climate; a 1 = contextualized-general, 2 = general-contextualized; b 1 = undergraduate 
student, 2 = graduate student, 3 = post-doc, 4 = lab manager, 5 = research scientist, 6 = research associate, 7 = principal investigator, 8 = other; c 1 = male, 2 
= female; * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01  
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other significant difference was between the contextualized biological and general measure 
in their relationship with compliance. This relationship, however, was not in the expected 
direction.  
Item-Level Analyses  
This study also incorporates an exploratory assessment of seven safety climate 
dimensions. The dimensions which were theorized to benefit most from contextualization are 
safety equipment & housekeeping, co-worker safety practices, and safety training. These 
analyses are exploratory because only one or two items were included for each dimension. 
Tables 12 through 18 present correlations for each dimension by safety outcome and 
laboratory type. In the following discussion, only the correlations that were significantly 
different are reported; the majority of the relationships within each of the seven dimensions 
were statistically equivalent. 
Management commitment to safety (item 1). Significant differences in the 
correlations with knowledge and behavior were opposite of expectations for the first 
management commitment item. The first item was less strongly related with safety 
knowledge when contextualized for mechanical/electrical laboratories (r = .39 vs. r = .64), 
Z(54) = -2.20, p = .03. The general management commitment item was also more strongly 
related with safety participation compared to the corresponding contextualized animal 
biological item (r = .31 vs. r = .45), Z(178) = -2.38, p = .02 and biological laboratory item (r 
= .35 vs. r = .46), Z(185) = -2.07, p = .04. The general item had a stronger relationship than 
the contextualized item with safety compliance for biological (r = .38 vs. r = .54), Z(185) = -
3.14, p = .002 and mechanical/electrical laboratories (r = .39 vs. r = .71), Z(54) = -3.16, p 
= .002.  
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Table 9 
Correlations between Safety Climate and Safety Knowledge and Safety Behavior by Laboratory 
Note. a p < .05 
 
  
Laboratory type Contextualized vs. 
general 
Knowledge Participation Compliance 
Animal biological Contextualized .44 .45 .47 
 General .41 .51 .45 
Biological Contextualized .41 .48 .52a 
 General .47 .53 .61a 
Chemical Contextualized .52 .49 .55 
 General .52 .51 .57 
Mechanical/electrical Contextualized .64 .63 .66 
 General .67 .71 .73 
Human subjects/office Contextualized .62a .59 .64 
 General .43a .47 .53 
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Table 10 
Correlations between Safety Climate and Injuries, Incidents, and Near Misses by Laboratory 
Note. a p < .05 
 
 
  
Laboratory type Contextualized vs. 
general 
Injuries Incidents Near misses 
Animal biological Contextualized -.15 -.14 -.22 
 General -.20 -.10 -.15 
Biological Contextualized -.28 -.21 -.35 
 General -.24 -.16 -.28 
Chemical Contextualized -.21 -.21 -.31 
 General -.17 -.17 -.33 
Mechanical/electrical Contextualized -.01 -.08 -.12 
 General -.12 -.12 -.10 
Human subjects/office Contextualized -.34a -.42 -.36 
 General -.13a -.29 -.24 
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Figure 2. Safety climate correlations for animal biological laboratories. n = 212. * p < .05. 
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 Figure 3. Safety climate correlations for biological laboratories. n = 219. * p < .05.  
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 Figure 4. Safety climate correlations for chemical laboratories. n = 124. * p < .05.  
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 Figure 5. Safety climate correlations for mechanical/electrical laboratories. n = 65. * p < .05.  
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 Figure 6. Safety climate correlations for human subjects/office laboratories. n = 126. * p < .05.  
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Table 11 
Correlations between Safety Climate Measures and the Five Safety Predictors 
 
Note. a p < .05 
  
Laboratory type 
Contextualized 
vs. general Knowledge Participation Compliance Injuries Incidents Near Misses 
Animal biological, biological, 
chemical, mechanical/electrical, human 
subjects/office (n = 644) 
 
Contextualized .52a .51 .54 -.17 -.14 -.25 
General .46a .50 .53 -.15 -.12 -.21 
Animal biological, biological, 
chemical, mechanical/electrical (n = 
529) 
 
 
Contextualized .47 .48a .52 -.18 -.16 -.28 
General .48 .53a .55 -.18 -.14 -.24 
Human subjects/office (n = 106) 
 
 
 
Contextualized .62a .59 .64 -.34a -.42 -.36 
General .43a .47 .53 -.13a -.29 -.24 
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 Figure 7. Safety climate correlations for all laboratory types. n = 644. * p < .05. 
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 Figure 8. Safety climate correlations for all laboratory types except human subjects/office. n = 529. * p < .05.
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Management commitment to safety (item 2). Results for the second management 
commitment to safety item were similarly not supportive of the notion that contextualized 
items result in stronger relationships. The second management commitment to safety item 
contextualized for animal biological laboratories was less strongly related with safety 
compliance (r = .28) compared to the general item (r = .45), Z(180) = -2.52, p = .01. The 
relationship with near misses for human subjects/office laboratories was the only instance in 
which this contextualized item significantly outperformed the general item (r = -.29 vs. r = 
-.09), Z(105) = -2.15, p = .03.  
Communication. A large majority of the correlations for the communication item 
were statistically equivalent. Of those that were significantly different, one was in the 
expected direction and one was not. The contextualized human subjects/office item was more 
strongly related to safety knowledge (r = .52) compared to the general item (r = .36), Z(106) 
= 2.04, p = .04. In contrast, the contextualized mechanical/electrical item was less strongly 
related to safety participation (r = .38) than the corresponding general item (r = .68), Z(56) = 
-2.85, p = .004.  
Training. Most of the correlations for the training item were also not significantly 
different. Those that were different were not in the expected direction. There was a 
significant difference between the two items with safety compliance for the biological 
laboratory (r = .33 vs. r = .50), Z(184) = -2.80, p = .005. Additionally, compared to the 
corresponding general item, the contextualized animal biological training item was less 
strongly related to injuries (r = .00 vs. r = -.14), Z(177) = 1.94, p = .05. 
Co-worker safety practices. Results for the co-worker safety practices item were 
mixed. Contrary to prediction, the contextualized item for mechanical/electrical laboratories  
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Table 12 
Correlations between Management Commitment to Safety Items and the Five Safety Predictors 
 
Notes. Item 1 read “My lab manager/PI strictly enforces the safe working procedures in my workgroup.” Item 2 read “My lab manager/PI takes a proactive 
stance when it comes to safety.” a p  < .05
Dimension Safety 
outcome 
Contextualized 
vs. general 
Animal 
biological 
Biological Chemical 
Mechanical/ 
electrical 
Human 
subjects/office 
Management 
commitment (item 1) 
Knowledge Contextualized .28 .28 .41 .39a .41 
 General .32 .36 .44 .64a .40 
 Participation Contextualized .31a .35a .32 .37 .36 
  General .45a .46a .43 .56 .45 
 Compliance Contextualized .33 .38a .45 .39a .44 
  General .34 .54a .54 .71a .52 
 Injuries Contextualized -.14 -.13 -.17 .08 -.23 
  General -.19 -.21 -.03 -.04 -.15 
 Incidents Contextualized -.08 -.16 -.17 -.04 -.30 
  General -.14 -.24 -.08 .00 -.33 
 Near misses Contextualized -.12 -.30 -.24 -.07 -.28 
  General -.14 -.39 -.22 .02 -.21 
Management 
commitment (item 2) 
Knowledge Contextualized .27 .29 .39 .62 .55 
 General .37 .40 .45 .65 .43 
 Participation Contextualized .28a .34 .41 .49 .54 
  General .45a .43 .46 .63 .51 
 Compliance Contextualized .28 .45 .47 .59 .54 
  General .39 .49 .48 .63 .51 
 Injuries Contextualized -.10 -.09 -.15 -.05 -.19 
  General -.19 -.14 -.03 -.09 -.14 
 Incidents Contextualized -.13 -.18 -.17 .13 -.32 
  General -.14 -.09 -.04 -.02 -.21 
 Near misses Contextualized -.13 -.27 -.26 -.17 -.29a 
  General -.13 -.17 -.26 .00 -.09a 
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Table 13 
Correlations between the Communication Item and the Five Safety Predictors 
Note. a p < .05 
  
Dimension Safety outcome Contextualized 
vs. general 
Animal 
biological 
Biological Chemical 
Mechanical/ 
electrical 
Human 
subjects/office 
Communication Knowledge Contextualized .38 .34 .49 .39 .52a 
  General .35 .35 .56 .46 .36a 
 Participation Contextualized .39 .40 .48 .38a .57 
  General .44 .42 .53 .68a .46 
 Compliance Contextualized .36 .38 .44 .45 .51 
  General .36 .43 .47 .53 .42 
 Injuries Contextualized -.09 -.09 -.22 .00 -.21 
  General -.17 -.14 -.18 -.04 -.04 
 Incidents Contextualized -.13 -.16 -.18 -.02 -.23 
  General -.15 -.11 -.15 -.08 -.22 
 Near misses Contextualized -.17 -.21 -.29 -.13 -.17 
  General -.12 -.19 -.27 -.07 -.24 
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Table 14 
Correlations between the Training Item and the Five Safety Predictors 
Note. a p < .05 
  
Dimension Safety outcome Contextualized 
vs. general 
Animal 
biological 
Biological Chemical 
Mechanical/ 
electrical 
Human 
subjects/office 
Training Knowledge Contextualized .35 .37 .49 .49 .45 
  General .37 .46 .54 .57 .41 
 Participation Contextualized .32 .36 .35 .45 .49 
  General .41 .43 .37 .51 .42 
 Compliance Contextualized .34 .33a .41 .50 .54 
  General .36 .50a .47 .63 .53 
 Injuries Contextualized .00a -.14 -.14 .06 -.23 
  General -.14a -.08 -.17 -.14 -.06 
 Incidents Contextualized -.02 -.05 -.21 -.04 -.28 
  General -.08 -.07 -.21 -.09 -.23 
 Near misses Contextualized .06 -.10 -.23 -.06 -.26 
  General -.02 -.14 -.29 -.19 -.22 
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was significantly less related with safety knowledge (r = .24), compared to the general item 
(r = .50), Z(55) = -1.97, p = .05. Comparisons of the correlations with safety compliance 
were similar for biological (r = .32 vs. r = .46), Z(186) = -2.48, p = .01, and 
mechanical/electrical items (r = .31 vs. r = .58), Z(55) = -2.16, p = .03. As expected, the 
contextualized human subjects/office item outperformed the general item in its relationship 
with safety knowledge (r = .55 vs. r = .33), Z(105) = 2.62, p = .009, and participation (r = .50 
vs. r = .28), Z(105) = 2.53, p = .01. The correlations with injuries for mechanical/electrical 
laboratory items did not support prediction (r = .13 vs. r = -.22), Z(55) = 2.42, p = .02, 
whereas the correlations for human subjects/office items were in the predicted direction (r = 
-.35 vs. r = -.17), Z(105) = -1.93, p = .05. 
Equipment & housekeeping (item 1). Most of the correlations for the first 
equipment & housekeeping item were statistically equivalent. The direction of the 
significantly different correlations were opposite of expectations. The general item was 
significantly more strongly related with safety participation for biological laboratories (r 
= .28 vs. r = .39), Z(185) = -2.06, p = .04. Similar results were found for the correlations with 
near misses for chemical laboratories (r = -.24 vs. r = -.40), Z(104) = 2.09, p = .04.  
Equipment & housekeeping (item 2). Results for the second equipment & 
housekeeping item were more supportive of the expected relationship. However, the 
differences were inconsistent. The second equipment & housekeeping item was significantly 
less strongly related with safety knowledge when contextualized for animal biological 
laboratories (r = .25 vs. r = .40), Z(175) = -2.34, p = .02. However, the same comparison for 
human subjects/office laboratories was in the expected direction (r = .49 vs. r = .30), Z(104) 
= 1.97, p = .05. Relationships with safety participation for animal biological items was also  
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Table 15 
 
Correlations between the Co-worker Safety Practices Item and the Five Safety Predictors 
 
Note. a p < .05 
  
Dimension Safety 
outcome 
Contextualized 
vs. general 
Animal 
biological 
Biological Chemical 
Mechanical/ 
electrical 
Human 
subjects/office 
Co-worker safety 
practices 
Knowledge Contextualized .25 .23 .31 .24a .55a 
 General .23 .33 .29 .50a .33a 
 Participation Contextualized .29 .26 .25 .50 .50a 
  General .31 .33 .32 .57 .28a 
 Compliance Contextualized .36 .32a .34 .31a .51 
  General .39 .46a .42 .58a .43 
 Injuries Contextualized -.15 -.37 -.11 .13a -.35a 
  General -.22 -.39 -.21 -.22a -.17a 
 Incidents Contextualized -.22 -.21 -.13 -.12 -.37 
  General -.15 -.21 -.17 -.30 -.27 
 Near misses Contextualized -.35 -.33 -.25 -.03 -.47 
  General -.28 -.33 -.24 -.20 -.41 
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significantly different (r = .27 vs. r = .44), Z(175) = -2.70, p = .007; however, it was not in 
the expected direction. 
Correlation comparisons with near misses, incidents, and injuries were supportive of 
the predicted relationship. Specifically, the item contextualized for animal biological 
laboratories was more strongly related with incidents (r = -.09 vs. r = .08), Z(175) = -2.48, p 
= .01. The comparison with near misses was similar for biological items (r = -.31 vs. r = 
-.16), Z(186) = -2.42, p = .02. The relationships with injuries for human subjects/office items 
were also in the predicted direction (r = -.53 vs. r = -.22), Z(104) = -3.23, p = .001. 
Involvement. Significant differences in the correlations for the involvement item 
were also mixed. In line with the expected results, the item contextualized for human 
subjects/office laboratories was significantly more strongly related with safety knowledge (r 
= .61 vs. r = .42), Z(104) = 2.92, p = .003. Comparisons of the correlations with safety 
knowledge and compliance for biological laboratory items were the opposite of what was 
predicted: safety knowledge (r = .27 vs. r = .41), Z(185) = -2.23, p = .03, and compliance (r 
= .33 vs. r = .51), Z(185) = -3.02, p = .003. A similar pattern of results was found for animal 
biological laboratory items in their relationship with safety participation (r = .34 vs. r = .52), 
Z(173) = -3.35, p = .001.  
The significantly different correlations with near misses, incidents, and injuries were 
in the expected direction. There was a significant difference between the animal biological 
item and general item in their relationship with near misses (r = -.17 vs. r = -.05), Z(173) = -
1.98, p = .05. The same was true for the human subjects/office items and injuries (r = -.30 vs. 
r = -.14), Z(104) = -2.08, p = .04. 
  87 
 
Table 16 
 
Correlations between Equipment & Housekeeping Items and the Five Safety Predictors 
  
Notes. Item 1 read “Equipment is checked to make sure it is free of faults.” Item 2 read “Unsafe conditions are promptly corrected  in my work area.” a p  
< .05 
  
Dimension Safety 
outcome 
Contextualized 
vs. general 
Animal 
biological 
Biological Chemical 
Mechanical/ 
electrical 
Human 
subjects/office 
Equipment & 
housekeeping (item 1) 
Knowledge Contextualized .39 .33 .41 .48 .44 
 General .33 .38 .36 .54 .40 
 Participation Contextualized .37 .28a .29 .41 .39 
  General .42 .39a .30 .52 .42 
 Compliance Contextualized .41 .43 .33 .48 .45 
  General .41 .50 .40 .64 .51 
 Injuries Contextualized -.07 -.39 -.19 -.11 -.27 
  General -.14 -.40 -.13 -.11 -.09 
 Incidents Contextualized .00 -.10 -.16 -.18 -.34 
  General .03 -.13 -.15 -.15 -.29 
 Near misses Contextualized -.15 -.36 -.24a -.16 -.25 
  General -.13 -.31 -.40a -.14 -.16 
Equipment & 
housekeeping (item 2) 
Knowledge Contextualized .25 .28a .35 .60 .49a 
 General .40 .39a .39 .61 .30a 
 Participation Contextualized .27a .37 .37 .55 .41 
  General .44a .47 .36 .69 .32 
 Compliance Contextualized .41 .41 .39 .61 .51 
  General .45 .49 .44 .66 .44 
 Injuries Contextualized -.02 -.29 -.15 -.09 -.53a 
  General -.09 -.21 -.15 .01 -.22a 
 Incidents Contextualized -.09a -.15 -.19 -.04 -.52a 
  General .08a -.05 -.11 .01 -.35a 
 Near misses Contextualized -.29 -.31a -.32 -.21 -.40 
  General -.17 -.16a -.24 -.05 -.29 
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Table 17 
 
Correlations between the Involvement Item and Safety Knowledge and the Five Safety Predictors 
 
Note. a p < .05 
  
Dimension Safety outcome Contextualized 
vs. general 
Animal 
biological 
Biological Chemical 
Mechanical/ 
electrical 
Human 
subjects/office 
Involvement Knowledge Contextualized .40 .27a .43 .63 .61a 
  General .42 .41a .43 .45 .42a 
 Participation Contextualized .34a .35 .48 .66 .49 
  General .52a .45 .48 .59 .46 
 Compliance Contextualized .34 .33a .49 .63 .57 
  General .38 .51a .41 .52 .48 
 Injuries Contextualized -.24 -.08 -.19 .03 -.30a 
  General -.17 -.08 -.15 -.16 -.14a 
 Incidents Contextualized -.10 -.14 -.19 -.14 -.39 
  General -.08 -.03 -.18 .03 -.25 
 Near misses Contextualized -.17a -.19 -.26 .06 -.28 
  General -.05a -.12 -.26 -.16 -.22 
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Rewards. Significant differences for the reward item were generally supportive of the 
predicted effects. The contextualized human subjects/office item was significantly  
more strongly related with safety knowledge (r = .55 vs. r = .39), Z(103) = 2.38, p = .02, 
safety participation (r = .62 vs. r = .50), Z(103) = 1.93, p = .05, and incidents (r = -.34 vs. r = 
-.19), Z(103) = -2.00, p = .05. However, the relationship for biological laboratories with 
safety compliance was the opposite (r = .36 vs. r = .49), Z(184) = -2.64, p = .008. 
Context Comparisons 
 It was purported that the five laboratories examined in this study are significantly 
different enough in risks and safety policies and procedures to warrant different 
contextualized safety climate measures. Follow-up analyses (independent t-tests) were 
conducted to examine the extent to which the five laboratories varied significantly on 
perceived risk, injuries, incidents, near misses, and an objective indicator of risk (biosafety 
level). 
Perceived job risk. Overall, the laboratories varied significantly on perceived job 
risk. An analysis of variance indicated that laboratory type (animal biological, biological, 
chemical, mechanical/electrical, and human subject/office) had a significant effect on 
perceived risk, F(4, 645) = 20.35, p < .001, η2 = .11. Human subjects/office laboratory 
members reported perceiving significantly less job risk (M = 1.16, SD = .45) compared to 
members of the four other laboratory types: animal biological (M = 1.86, SD = .83), t(290) = 
-9.32, d = -.98, p < .001, biological (M = 1.60, SD = .71), t(300) = -6.60, d = -.70, p < .001, 
chemical (M = 1.99, SD = .94), t(217) = -8.32, d = -1.13, p < .001, and mechanical/electrical 
(M = 1.82, SD = .90), t(217) = -5.23, d = -1.03, p < .001. Further, the perceived risk 
associated with biological laboratories (M = 1.60, SD = .71) was significantly less than  
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Table 18 
 
Correlations between the Rewards Item and Safety Knowledge and the Five Safety Predictors 
 
Note. a p < .05 
  
Dimension Safety outcome Contextualized 
vs. general 
Animal 
biological 
Biological Chemical 
Mechanical/ 
electrical 
Human 
subjects/office 
Rewards Knowledge Contextualized .34 .31 .30 .56 .55a 
  General .37 .37 .25 .62 .39a 
 Participation Contextualized .34 .44 .40 .51 .62a 
  General .40 .46 .37 .61 .50a 
 Compliance Contextualized .30 .36a .38 .58 .58 
  General .33 .49a .41 .57 .46 
 Injuries Contextualized -.20 -.20 -.14 -.13 -.21 
  General -.20 -.11 -.16 -.08 -.10 
 Incidents Contextualized -.18 -.21 -.09 -.11 -.34a 
  General -.12 -.20 -.10 -.28 -.19a 
 Near misses Contextualized -.16 -.22 -.11 -.11 -.25 
  General -.12 -.18 -.17 .05 -.13 
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animal biological (M = 1.86, SD = .83), t(372) = -3.23, d = -.34, p = .001, chemical (M = 
1.99, SD = .94), t(299) = -3.78, d = -.49, p < .001, and mechanical/electrical (M = 1.82, SD 
= .90), t(217) = -1.95, d = -.29, p = .05. None of the other laboratory types differed 
significantly from one another with respect to perceived job risk. 
Injuries. Laboratory type did not have a significant effect on the self-reported 
number of injuries, F(4, 646) = 1.85, p = .12, η2 = .01. There were no significant differences 
between human subjects/office (M = .15, SD = .66), animal biological (M = .33, SD = 1.12), 
biological (M = .18, SD = .67), chemical (M = .56, SD = 2.63), or mechanical/electrical 
laboratory members (M = .38, SD = .97) in the number of reported injuries. 
Incidents. An analysis of variance indicated that there were significant differences 
across laboratory types as related to self-reported incidents, F(4, 638) = 4.27, p = .002, η2 
= .03. The number of incidents was significantly less for human subjects/office (M = .10, SD 
= .43), compared to animal biological (M = .49, SD = 1.40), t(287) = -3.52, d = -.34, p = .001, 
biological (M = .26, SD = .74), t(298) = -2.30, d = -.25, p = .02, and chemical laboratories (M 
= .86, SD = 2.67), t(214) = -2.91, d = -.40, p = .004. Biological laboratory respondents 
reported significantly fewer incidents (M = .26, SD = .74), compared to animal biological (M 
= .49, SD = 1.40), t(369) = -2.03, d = -.21, p = .04, and chemical laboratories (M = .86, SD = 
2.67), t(296) = -2.29, d = -.35, p = .02, There were no other significant differences in the 
number of incidents for the five laboratory types.  
Near misses. Likewise, there were differences across laboratory types in the number 
of self-reported near misses, F(4, 643) = 3.94, p = .004, η2 = .02. The self-reported number of 
near misses associated with human subjects/office laboratories (M = .27, SD = .84) was 
significantly less than those associated with animal biological (M = .72, SD = 1.61), t(289) = 
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-3.10, d = -.33, p = .002, biological (M = .58, SD = 1.53), t(301) = -2.30, d = -.23, p = .02, 
chemical (M = 1.19, SD = 2.80), t(216) = -3.26, d = -.45, p = .001, and mechanical/electrical 
(M = .78, SD = 1.80), t(167) = -2.03, d = -.41, p = .05. Additionally, biological respondents 
reported significantly fewer near misses (M = .58, SD = 1.53) than chemical laboratory 
respondents (M = 1.19, SD = 2.80), t(297) = -2.08, d = -.29, p = .04. None of the other 
laboratory types significantly differed in the number of reported near misses.  
Biosafety level. The biosafety level of biological laboratory respondents (Mdn = 2.00, 
n = 188) did not significantly differ from the animal biosafety level of animal biological 
laboratory respondents (Mdn = 2.00, n = 141), U = 12780.00, z = -.64, p = .52, r = -.04.  
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4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Industry-specific items are often included in safety climate measures (Beus et al., 
2013; Zohar, 2003; 2010); however, the effectiveness of this measurement approach is 
uncertain because few researchers have rigorously compared a general safety climate 
measure to a contextualized measure. The purpose of this study was to provide a rigorous test 
of the effectiveness of contextualizing a safety climate measure based on the extent to which 
safety knowledge, behavior, and safety-related events predict a contextualized safety climate 
measure compared to a general measure. Five contextualized safety climate measures (animal 
biological, biological, chemical, mechanical/electrical, and human subjects/office) were 
developed. Thus, the effectiveness of contextualization was assessed five times.  
Huang et al. (2013) found that a truck-driving specific safety climate measure added a 
significant increment in validity (6% and 11%) to the prediction of driving behavior above a 
general measure; however, the present study indicates that definitive conclusions about 
industry-specific safety climate measures as universally better predictors should be tempered. 
Contextualized safety climate measures had stronger relationships with safety knowledge, 
behavior, and safety-related events in some cases, but not in others. In most cases, the 
relationships with the general measure and relationships with the context-specific measure 
were not significantly different, especially for three of the five labs: animal biological, 
chemical, and mechanical/electrical measures. Contextualization appeared to be most useful 
for human subjects/office laboratories. The contextualized human subjects/office measure 
related more strongly to all six predictors than the general measure and this difference was 
statistically significant for safety knowledge and injuries.  
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 Another objective of the current investigation involved a preliminary assessment of 
contextualized and general items for seven safety climate dimensions. Each dimension was 
examined with either one or two items. Most of the general vs. contextualized item-level 
correlations with predictors were not significantly different from one another, which is 
consistent with the lack of difference found at the scale level of analysis. When significant 
differences emerged for the training, co-worker safety practices, and management 
commitment to safety dimensions, they tended to indicate stronger relationships with the 
general item or no interpretable pattern. The rewards safety climate dimension did, however, 
demonstrate relationship patterns consistent with prediction: a majority of the significant 
relationships indicated that the contextualized item, especially human subjects/office, had a 
stronger relationship with predictors than the corresponding general item. There were about 
an equal amount of significantly different correlations in which the general item 
outperformed the contextualized item and vice versa for co-worker safety practices, 
equipment & housekeeping, and employee involvement. No consistent pattern emerged for 
these items. Overall, the results did not support the notion that some safety climate 
dimensions are more conducive to contextualization than others. 
Theoretical Implications 
This study contributes to industry-specific safety climate literature by providing a 
preliminary theoretical explanation for the usefulness of a contextualized approach based on 
comprehension and recall. Contextualized items purportedly lead to more complete recall, 
because they aid in the recall process and are more interpretable to respondents. Further 
research is necessary to directly test if contextualized information facilitates comprehension 
and recall. Simply asking respondents if the contextualized items were more comprehensible 
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and facilitated recollection of relevant events would provide some initial information about 
the viability of this theoretical explanation. 
The usefulness of contextualized information in safety climate measures might vary 
because of differences in risk. In this study, five types of laboratories were identified and 
differentiated based on laboratory-specific risks. Animal biological, biological, chemical, and 
mechanical/electrical laboratories utilize equipment and materials that can cause bodily harm 
or even death (DeRoos, 1977; Furr, 2000). The contextualized safety climate measures 
developed for these laboratory types incorporated some of these risks, including chemical 
and biohazards, infectious waste, sources of radiation, and dangerous equipment (e.g., power 
and machine tools, incinerators, lasers, soldering irons, etc.). Understandably, safety in these 
laboratories is of great importance to universities because major accidents have far-reaching 
consequences (National Research Council, 2014). Arguably, university laboratories are more 
regulated than ever before. Most laboratory personnel are required to complete extensive 
safety training dealing with general and laboratory-specific risks, although training varies 
across institutions (National Research Council, 2014).  
The risks associated with human subjects/office laboratories are minor in comparison. 
Some of the risks identified for the contextualized human subjects/office measure include 
electrical, tripping, and fall hazards. Follow up analyses supported the significantly low risk 
and reported incidents and near misses associated with human subjects/office laboratories 
compared to the other laboratory types. Given these differences, there is often minimal to no 
safety procedures or training in place for human subjects/office laboratory personnel. 
Regulations and training mainly focus on reducing risks for human subject participants, 
rather than laboratory members (Protection of Human Subjects, 2009).  
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The usefulness of contextualized information in safety climate measures might vary 
because of differences in risk and subsequent comprehension and recall. Contextualization 
assists with comprehension by expanding on the meaning of individual items and helps 
respondents remember relevant experiences. This might be particularly useful for human 
subjects/office personnel, because they tend to be less experienced with risk and safety 
regulations and training. Human subjects/office laboratory personnel might provide a 
deficient assessment of safety climate when responding to general items because they are 
unsure of what constitutes a risk in their laboratory and are more likely to question the item’s 
meaning. In turn, they recall and respond based on relatively few (if any) experiences.  
Contextualized information might not be as useful at assisting in comprehension and 
recall for members of other laboratories. Those from other laboratory types might have little 
difficulty interpreting the meaning of general items because safety is an integral aspect of 
their work duties and training. They might not need cues to recall specific events because 
they experience more risks and are trained to recognize and remember them.  
The results of this study indicate the circumstances in which there might be value in 
adding contextualized information to safety climate measures. The results generally indicate 
that contextualized items might be less effective for those industries that have strict 
guidelines and policies to follow and risks that are more prevalent. Those individuals who 
work in risky environments and experience stricter safety regulations might be more likely to 
appropriately interpret, recall, and respond to general items. There might be value in adding 
contextualized information when the risks associated with a given industry are less salient. 
Contextualized information might help respondents from these contexts/industries realize and 
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recognize the risks around them. Future research is necessary to explore these propositions 
further. 
The results of this study differ from previous efforts. Compared to the present study, 
Huang et al. (2013) conducted the most similar study of industry-specific measure 
effectiveness to date. They found support for the incremental validity of an industry-specific 
measure over a general measure in the prediction of a relevant safety outcome. In 
comparison, this study found inconsistent support for advantages to using an industry-
specific measure over a general measure.  
There are a variety of potential reasons for the differences observed between the 
current study and Huang et al.’s (2013) study. First, the study designs were different. In this 
study, the safety-related variables examined were treated as predictors because they were 
measured concurrently with safety climate rather than subsequently. Huang et al. conducted a 
prospective study in which safety climate was treated as a predictor of driving behavior 
despite measuring both variables concurrently. Safety climate was also used to predict 
injuries that occurred six months after climate was measured. This allowed for testing the 
incremental validity explained in injuries of contextualized safety climate over and above 
general safety climate. 
Second, the contextualized measures examined in the current study and Huang et al. 
(2013) were different. Huang et al. developed entirely new industry-specific items, whereas 
in this study the contextualized and general items shared the same stems. Given their 
similarly, measures in the current study might have been more prone to issues with short-
term memory effects leading to overly inflated relationships between contextualized and 
general measures and the various predictors. In comparison, Huang et al.’s (2013) general 
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and industry-specific safety climate items were less similar and potentially less prone to 
short-term memory effects. However, similarities between general and contextualized items 
in this study were purposeful to provide a more rigorous, unconfounded test of the inclusion 
of contextual information in a safety climate measure.  
 Safety climate dimensions. A majority of the general vs. contextualized item-level 
correlations with various predictors were not significantly different. However, there are a few 
notable exceptions. The human subjects/office safety climate measure was more strongly 
related to multiple predictors across all seven dimensions. This was especially the case for 
rewards. This finding conflicts with expectations, but is in line with the previous discussion. 
The reward system for safety in many human subjects/office laboratories might be especially 
limited, or nonexistent because the risks are minimal. Consequently, human subject/office 
personnel might be less familiar with the practice of rewarding safe behavior. Contextualized 
information in relation to rewards might be particularly useful to provide meaning and aid in 
the recall process. However, this might not be as applicable to personnel from other 
laboratory types. Members of other laboratories might have more experience with rewards 
for safe behavior, because they have witnessed or perhaps even benefitted from a reward 
system. However, this explanation is speculative because these propositions were not directly 
examined in the current study. 
 Contextualized information for the following safety climate dimensions: training, 
management commitment, and communication does not appear to be very helpful. 
Additionally, patterns of results for the other safety climate dimensions (i.e., co-worker 
safety practices, employee involvement, and equipment & housekeeping) were inconsistent. 
For these dimensions, general safety climate items were more strongly related than 
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contextualized items to safety knowledge and behavior. In contrast, contextualized items for 
these dimensions had significantly stronger relationships than general items with injuries, 
incidents, and near misses. It would not be appropriate to make any substantive conclusions 
about the value of adding contextual information to specific safety climate dimensions at this 
time. This preliminary analysis was limited to one or two items per dimension. More items 
per dimension must be analyzed in order to make definitive conclusions. 
Practical Implications 
 The main practical implication of this study is determining the usefulness of industry-
specific information within safety climate measures. Many applied and academic researchers 
utilize industry-specific safety climate measures and assume that they are effective as 
predictors of outcomes. However, prior to this study, a rigorous comparison had not been 
conducted. The results do not offer definitive support for contextualized safety climate 
measurement.  
It appears that contextualized measures might be most useful in less safety-salient 
contexts, which should be taken in consideration when deciding between using an industry-
specific or general safety climate measure. Contextualization might be most effective for 
contexts in which general items are less likely to cue relevant memories or enhance 
comprehension of the items. However, general measures appear to be equally or more 
effective for those industries that are very risky and tend to be more strictly regulated.  
As noted earlier, there are a lot of practical reasons to utilize a general measure of 
safety climate over an industry-specific one. General measures facilitate comparisons across 
organizations and industries because they are applicable to all contexts. They are easier to 
develop and shorter to administer.  
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Limitations and Future Directions 
The present study was limited in a variety of ways. One potential limitation was the 
cross-sectional design and associated biases. All study variables were collected at the same 
time (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Cross-sectional designs might bias results because they 
increase the likelihood that predictor and criterion variables will be remembered and 
facilitate the use of implicit theories (Podsakoff et al., 2003). A common way to avoid such 
biases is to temporally separate measures (Podsakoff et al., 2012).  
In this study, however, the biases associated with the cross-sectional design appear to 
be limited. Follow-up analyses of counterbalancing indicated that there was little evidence 
for order effects. Additionally, any biases resulting from measuring all study variables at the 
same time would be unlikely to support the hypotheses which focused on differences in the 
relationships between the two safety climate measures and various safety-related predictors. 
Method effects associated with the cross-sectional design such as short-term memory are 
more likely to lead to an inflated relationship between predictors and both safety climate 
measures, rather than the hypothesized differences. The results for the contextualized human 
subjects/office measure are especially salient given these considerations. Short-term memory 
effects are one potential explanation for the difference between the results of this study and 
Huang et al. (2013). Future research might space out the administration of measures to 
further limit method effects. 
Another limitation of the study design was the measurement and analysis of 
psychological safety climate rather than workgroup safety climate. By definition, safety 
climate is a unit-level construct (employees shared perceptions) that should be measured by 
aggregating individual responses to the workgroup level. Group-level safety climate is more 
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strongly related to safety outcomes compared to psychological safety climate (Beus et al., 
2010). Unfortunately, organizational constraints prohibited gathering workgroup (laboratory) 
identification information. Consequently, this study was restricted to examining 
psychological safety climate. It remains to be seen if similar results would emerge at the 
group level of analysis. 
Design limitations also prevented linking the survey data to prospective incident data 
and the research questions that could be answered. Recent meta-analytic findings support 
safety climate as both a leading and lagging indicator of workplace safety (Beus et al., 2010). 
It would be also be informative to compare the predictive validity of a contextualized safety 
climate measure to a general safety climate measure, as well as the incremental validity 
explained by each measure over and above the other. This would require gathering 
prospective incident data (organizational records or self-report) and the means to link such 
data to the safety climate measure data. Unfortunately, organizational constraints prohibited 
such efforts. 
Further avenues for future research include contextualized measure development and 
assessment. The contextualization approach taken in the current study ensured the only 
difference between the contextualized measure and the general measure was the provision of 
context, thus providing a more rigorous comparison of a contextualized measure to a general 
measure. However, this approach differs from how industry-specific measures have been 
historically developed by creating entirely new items that incorporate contextual information 
based on interviews with subject-matter experts. The approach in this study and previous 
efforts are fundamentally similar; in both cases, safety climate items incorporate information 
specific to a particular context. It was beyond the scope of this study to determine the best 
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way to develop an industry-specific measure. Future research might be targeted at comparing 
and contrasting various approaches to contextualization. 
Another potential limitation of the measure development technique was the 
identification and inclusion of contextualized information. Tours of laboratories and a review 
of the pertinent literature indicate that there are consistent risks across laboratories; however, 
there are also substantial within-laboratory differences. The contextualized information 
included in each item was derived based on relevant literature and verified by subject-matter 
experts. However, it is possible that some of the information was incomplete or not specific 
enough for individual laboratories.  
Conclusion 
 Safety climate experts advocate including industry-specific items when measuring 
safety climate. Indeed, a recent summary of the safety climate research called for industry-
specific measure development and analysis (Zohar, 2010). In their recent assessment, Huang 
et al. (2013) found that an industry-specific approach accounts for significant incremental 
validity in the prediction of relevant outcomes. The purpose of this study was to provide a 
rigorous test of the effectiveness of an industry-specific safety climate measure based on how 
well safety knowledge, behavior, and safety-related events predict a contextualized safety 
climate measure compared to a general safety climate measure. Theoretical arguments for the 
effectiveness of a contextualized measure were based on enhanced comprehension and recall 
when completing such measures. 
University research laboratory personnel completed one of five contextualized safety 
climate measures associated with their laboratory, a general measure, and self-reports of 
safety knowledge, behavior, and outcomes. Only the contextualized human subjects/office 
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laboratory measure was consistently more strongly related to the predictors, which provides 
some support for the underlying theoretical arguments. Contextualized information might 
facilitate comprehension and recall for individuals who work in less risky industries. Item-
level analyses indicate that contextualization for the rewards dimension of safety climate is 
particularly effective. Ideally, this study will stimulate further research on the development 
and assessment of contextualized/industry-specific measures.  
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APPENDIX A 
GENERAL SAFETY CLIMATE MEASURE 
Thinking of your current workgroup, please read the statements listed 
below and mark the response that indicates the extent to which you agree 
with each statement. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. My lab manager/PI strictly enforces the safe working procedures in my 
workgroup. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. My lab manager/PI takes a proactive stance when it comes to safety. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Safety issues are openly discussed between my lab manager/PI and my 
workgroup. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. There is adequate safety training in my workgroup. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. My co-workers always follow safety procedures. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Equipment is checked to make sure it is free of faults. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Unsafe conditions are promptly corrected in my work area. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. My lab manager/PI promotes employees’ involvement in safety related 
matters. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. My lab manager/PI praises safe work behavior. 1 2 3 4 5 
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APPENDIX B 
ANIMAL BIOLOGICAL LABORATORIES SAFETY CLIMATE MEASURE 
Do you work in an animal biological laboratory? These laboratories are 
 classified as Animal Biosafety Level 1, 2, 3, or 4. 
 regulated by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC). 
 Radiation may be a hazard of the work involved (e.g., the use of x-ray equipment). 
 
Yes (direct to the animal biological lab measure) 
No (direct to the biological lab question) 
 
Thinking of the research laboratory (lab) that you work in, the people you work with in the lab (co-workers), and the people you report to (lab 
manager, Principal Investigator (PI) of the lab), please read the statements listed below and mark the response that indicates the extent to 
which you agree with each statement. 
  
Note – if YOU are a lab manager/PI please respond based on your own behavior. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1. My lab manager/PI strictly enforces the safe working procedures in my workgroup. This includes: 
 Corrects unsafe work practices (e.g., stops a lab member from using an x-ray machine without their personal dosimeter). 
 Does not tolerate a deviation from safe work practices (e.g., sends lab members home to change shoes if they are wearing open-toe shoes). 
 Dismissing lab members from the lab who have a major safety violation that could have been prevented (e.g., leaving animal cages open) or 
repeated instances of unsafe work behavior (e.g., animal bites caused by improper handling). 
 
2. My lab manager/PI takes a proactive stance when it comes to safety. For example, 
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 Develops and institutes practices to deal with potential safety incidents before they occur (e.g., practices for avoiding inhalation of hazardous 
aerosols). 
 Emphasizes the importance of safety to all new lab members when they join the lab. 
 Raises safety concerns when planning and developing research projects and studies. 
 Considers the safety ramifications before introducing a new biological or equipment hazard. 
 
3. Safety issues are openly discussed between my lab manager/PI and my workgroup. For instance, we 
 Discuss improper use of personal protective equipment (PPE) and other equipment in the lab. 
 Discuss proper animal care including handling, feeding, cage cleaning, and disposal. 
 Share lessons learned following a safety-related incident in our lab or other labs (e.g., severe illness and deaths caused by exposure).  
 
4. There is adequate safety training in my workgroup. Some of the things that we could be informed about and given initial and refresher training on 
include: 
 Standards and guidelines described in the following books: 
o Center for Disease Control’s (CDC) Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories  
o U.S. Department of Health and Human Services NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid and Molecules 
 The nature of animal, biological (e.g., infectious material), and/or equipment hazards and how to protect ourselves. 
 Proper detection and response to a biohazard release. 
 How to respond to safety incidents ranging from minor to severe. 
 
5. My co-workers always follow safety procedures. This includes 
The use of PPE: 
 Wear appropriate clothes in the laboratory (i.e., closed toe shoes, laboratory coat/smock, and full-length shirts and pants) 
 Don appropriate PPE when handling animals, risky equipment, chemicals, and biohazards (e.g., goggles, face masks, visors, gloves/gauntlets, 
aprons, respirators, etc.). 
Other standard animal safety procedures: 
 Use of biosafety cabinet when working with biohazards. 
 Use of fume hoods when working with biohazards, chemicals, radioactive material, and any other material that releases hazardous aerosols. 
 Store, label, and date biohazards and chemicals appropriately. 
 Appropriate animal cage decontamination, cleaning, and washing. 
 Dispose of biohazardous/infectious waste and animals properly. 
 Respond and react to infectious material spills and releases according to procedures. 
 Do not eat in the lab and do not store food with laboratory specimens.  
 Do not pipette by mouth.  
 Safety handling and disposal of sharps.  
 Decontamination of equipment, workspaces, and infectious material. 
 Document safety-related issues and concerns. 
 Operate equipment and work with animals only after receiving necessary training. 
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6. Equipment in my lab is checked to make sure it is free of faults (a list of some of the equipment and furniture that is likely to be in your lab is provided 
below). 
 Biosafety cabinets 
 Centrifuges 
 Autoclaves 
 Animal cages 
 Cage washers (rack washer, cabinet washer, tunnel washer) 
 Incinerators 
 Fume hoods 
 Power and machine tools (e.g., saws, drills, cutting tools, welding 
equipment, solder, table saw, band saw, press, lathe, milling 
machine, etc.) 
 X-ray equipment 
 Burners and hot plates 
 Refrigerators/Freezers  
 Compressed gas cylinders 
 Distillations and condensers 
 Ovens  
 Heating baths 
 Stills 
 Glassware 
 Containers and carts 
 Base units and work tops 
 
7. Unsafe conditions are promptly corrected in my work area. For instance, 
 The lab (including animal cages) is cleaned regularly and clutter is removed.  
 Work surfaces and equipment are decontaminated promptly after completion of work. 
 Animal waste and infectious material spills and releases are promptly taken care of. 
 Biohazardous material and chemicals are promptly and appropriately stored. 
 Hazardous equipment and machinery are turned off when not in use. 
 Electrical circuits, components, and equipment are grounded before and after use. 
 Sharps and broken glassware are promptly disposed of.  
 
8. My lab manager/PI promotes lab members’ involvement in safety-related matters. This includes 
 Confer with us about safety concerns and new training for equipment (e.g., x-ray machine) that may be needed. 
 Discuss with us the best way to comply with new safety regulations imposed by the university and regulatory agencies. 
 Seek input from my workgroup when developing new safety-related procedures (e.g., handling animals). 
 Listen attentively to lab members’ safety concerns and seek solutions. 
 Discuss safety in lab meetings. 
 
9. My lab manager/PI praises safe work behavior. Some of the ways he/she might do this are 
 Provide positive feedback when working safely (e.g., proper use of PPE). 
 Recognize lab members for their safe behavior. 
 Give lab members who conduct safe work behavior more discretion and authority (e.g., they are allowed to operate more hazardous equipment). 
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APPENDIX C 
BIOLOGICAL LABORATORIES CLIMATE MEASURE 
Do you work in a biological laboratory? These laboratories  
 involve the use of biological agents/materials. 
 are classified as Biosafety Level (BSL) 1, 2, 3, or 4. 
 conduct research involving “pathogens and potential pathogens of humans, animals, or plants; materials potentially containing human 
pathogens (including human blood, saliva, tissue, and cell lines; non-human primate blood, tissue, and cell lines); recombinant DNA (and 
RNA), including creation or use of transgenic plants and animals; select agents and toxins including strains and amounts exempted from 
the select agent regulations; or any material requiring a CDC import license or a USDA permit” (“Biohazards in research,” 2012). 
Radioactivity is also a common hazard in this environment.  
 are regulated by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC). 
 Radiation may be a hazard of the work involved (e.g., the use of x-ray equipment). 
 
Yes (direct to the biological lab measure) 
No (direct to the chemical lab question) 
 
Thinking of the research laboratory (lab) that you work in, the people you work with in the lab (co-workers), and the people you report to (lab 
manager, Principal Investigator (PI) of the lab), please read the statements listed below and mark the response that indicates the extent to 
which you agree with each statement. 
  
Note – if YOU are a lab manager/PI please respond based on your own behavior. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
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1. My lab manager/PI strictly enforces the safe working procedures in my workgroup. This includes: 
 Corrects unsafe work practices (e.g., stops lab member from eating in the lab).  
 Does not tolerate a deviation from safe work practices (e.g., sends lab members home to change shoes if they are wearing open-toe shoes). 
 Dismisses lab members from the lab who have a major safety violation that could have been prevented (e.g., an overexposure to high levels of 
radiation) or repeated instances of unsafe work behavior (e.g., improper biohazardous material disposal). 
 
2. My lab manager/PI takes a proactive stance when it comes to safety. For example, 
 Develops and institutes practices to deal with potential safety incidents before they occur (e.g., practices for avoiding accidental exposure to 
infectious agents). 
 Emphasizes the importance of safety to all new lab members when they join the lab. 
 Raises safety concerns when planning and developing research projects and studies. 
 Considers the safety ramifications before introducing a new biological or equipment hazard.  
 
3. Safety issues are openly discussed between my lab manager/PI and my workgroup. For instance, we 
 Discuss improper use of personal protective equipment (PPE) and other equipment in the lab. 
 Discuss proper biohazardous material handling, labeling, storage, and disposal. 
 Share lessons learned following a safety-related incident in our lab or other labs (e.g., severe illness and deaths caused by exposure).  
 
4. There is adequate safety training in my workgroup. Some of the things that we could be informed about and given initial and refresher training on 
include: 
 Standards and guidelines described in the following books: 
o Center for Disease Control’s (CDC) Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories  
o U.S. Department of Health and Human Services NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid and 
Molecules 
 The nature of biological (e.g., infectious) material and/or equipment hazards and how to protect ourselves. 
 Proper detection and response to a biohazard release. 
 How to respond to safety incidents ranging from minor to severe. 
 
5. My co-workers always follow safety procedures. This includes 
The use of PPE: 
 Wear appropriate clothes in the laboratory (i.e., closed toe shoes, laboratory coat/smock, and full-length shirts and pants) 
 Don appropriate PPE when handling risky equipment, radioactive materials, chemicals, and biohazards (e.g., chemical splash goggles, gloves, hot 
mitts, aprons, respirators, etc.). 
Other standard biosafety procedures: 
 Use of biosafety cabinet when working with biohazards. 
 Use of fume hoods when working with chemicals, radioactive material, and any other material that releases hazardous aerosols. 
 Store, label, and date biohazards and chemicals appropriately. 
 Dispose of biohazardous/infectious waste properly. 
 Respond and react to infectious material spills and releases according to procedures. 
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 Do not eat in the lab and do not store food with laboratory specimens.  
 Do not pipette by mouth.  
 Safety handling and disposal of sharps.  
 Decontamination of equipment, workspaces, and infectious material. 
 Document safety-related issues and concerns. 
 Operate equipment only after receiving necessary training. 
 
6. Equipment in my lab is checked to make sure it is free of faults (a list of some of the equipment that is likely to be in your lab is provided below). 
 Biosafety cabinets 
 Centrifuges 
 Autoclaves 
 Fume hoods 
 Lasers 
 Hydraulically- or pneumatically-driven equipment 
 Power and machine tools (e.g., saws, drills, cutting tools, welding 
equipment, solder, table saw, band saw, press, lathe, milling 
machine, etc.) 
 X-ray equipment 
 Exercise equipment (e.g., treadmill, weightlifting equipment, 
stationary bicycles) 
 Burners and hot plates  
 Refrigerators/Freezers 
 Compressed gas cylinders  
 Distillations and condensers 
 Ovens 
 Heating baths 
 Hydrostatic weighing tank 
 Stills 
 Glassware 
 Containers and carts 
 Base units and work tops 
 
7. Unsafe conditions are promptly corrected in my work area. For instance, 
 The lab is cleaned regularly and clutter is removed.  
 Work surfaces and equipment are decontaminated promptly after completion of work. 
 Infectious material spills and releases are promptly taken care of. 
 Biohazards and chemicals are promptly and appropriately stored. 
 Lasers and other hazardous equipment and machinery are turned off when not in use. 
 Electrical circuits, components, and equipment are grounded before and after use.  
 Sharps and broken glassware are promptly disposed of.  
 
8. My lab manager/PI promotes lab members’ involvement in safety-related matters. This includes 
 Confer with us about safety concerns and new training for equipment (e.g., band saw) that may be needed. 
 Discuss with us the best way to comply with new safety regulations imposed by the university and regulatory agencies. 
 Seek input from my workgroup when developing new safety-related procedures (e.g., proper disposal of biohazardous waste). 
 Listen attentively to lab members’ safety concerns and seek solutions. 
 Discuss safety in lab meetings. 
 
9. My lab manager/PI praises safe work behavior. Some of the ways he/she might do this are 
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 Provide positive feedback when working safely (e.g., proper use of PPE). 
 Recognize lab members for their safe behavior. 
 Give lab members who conduct safe work behavior more discretion and authority (e.g., they are allowed to operate more hazardous equipment). 
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APPENDIX D 
CHEMICAL LABORATORIES SAFETY CLIMATE MEASURE 
Do you work in a chemical laboratory? These laboratories  
 use hazardous chemicals including “cancer-causing agents (carcinogens), toxins that may affect the liver, kidney, or nervous system, 
irritants, corrosives, and sensitizers, as well as agents that act on the blood system or damage the lungs, skin, eyes, or mucous membranes” 
(“OSHA factsheet,” 2011). A list of chemical hazards and examples is provided below.  
 may potentially be categorized by Chemical Safety Level 1, 2, 3, or 4. 
 are regulated by Environmental Health and Safety (EHS) industrial hygiene group. 
 Radiation may be a hazard of the work involved (e.g., the use of radioactive material) 
 
Type of chemical 
hazard 
Examples 
Carcinogens Asbestos  
Benzene  
Tobacco smoke  
Hexavalent Chromium  
Aflatoxins  
Carbon tetrachloride 
Toxins Hydrogen cyanide  
Hydrogen sulfide  
Nitrogen dioxide  
Ricin  
Organophosphate pesticides  
Arsenic 
Mercury  
Lead  
Formaldehyde 
Irritants Ammonia  
Formaldehyde  
Halogens  
Sulfur dioxide  
Poison ivy  
Dust 
Pollen 
Mold 
Acidic corrosives 
 
Hydrochloric acid  
Nitric Acid 
Sulfuric acid 
Acetic Acid 
Propionic acid 
Alkaline, or basic, 
corrosives 
Sodium hydroxide  
 
Potassium hydroxide 
Corrosive 
dehydrating agents 
Phosphorous pentoxide  
 
Calcium oxide 
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Corrosive oxidizing 
agents 
Halogen gases  
Hydrogen peroxide (concentrated) 
Perchloric acid 
Organic corrosive Butylamine  
Sensitizers Isocyanates  
Nickel salts  
Beryllium compounds  
Formaldehyde  
Diazomethane  
Latex 
 
Yes (direct to the chemical lab measure) 
No (direct to the mechanical/electrical lab question) 
 
Thinking of the research laboratory (lab) that you work in, the people you work with in the lab (co-workers), and the people you report to (lab 
manager, Principal Investigator (PI) of the lab), please read the statements listed below and mark the response that indicates the extent to 
which you agree with each statement. 
  
Note – if YOU are a lab manager/PI please respond based on your own behavior. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1. My lab manager/PI strictly enforces the safe working procedures in my workgroup. This includes: 
 Corrects unsafe work practices (e.g., stops lab member from eating in the lab). 
 Does not tolerate a deviation from safe work practices (e.g., sends lab members home to change shoes if they are wearing open-toe shoes). 
 Dismisses lab members from the lab who have a major safety violation that could have been prevented (e.g., an injury caused by the improper use 
of machinery) or repeated instances of unsafe work behavior (e.g., storing incompatible chemicals together). 
 
2. My lab manager/PI takes a proactive stance when it comes to safety. For example, 
 Develops and institutes practices to deal with potential safety incidents before they occur (e.g., practices for avoiding electric shock). 
 Emphasizes the importance of safety to all new lab members when they join the lab. 
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 Raises safety concerns when planning and developing research projects and studies. 
 Considers the safety ramifications before introducing a new chemical or equipment hazard. 
 
3. Safety issues are openly discussed between my lab manager/PI and my workgroup. For instance, we 
 Discuss improper use of personal protective equipment (PPE) and other equipment in the lab. 
 Discuss proper chemical handling, labeling, storage, and disposal. 
 Share lessons learned following a safety-related incident in our lab or other labs (e.g., severe injuries and deaths caused by improper chemical 
handling).  
 
4. There is adequate safety training in my workgroup. Some of the things that we could be informed about and given initial and refresher training on 
include: 
 Standards and guidelines described in the following: 
o Texas A&M EHS Chemical Laboratory Safety and Hazard Communication Compliance Manual  
o TAMU Safety Manual: Chemical Safety 
 The nature of chemical and/or equipment hazards and how to protect ourselves. 
 Proper detection and response to a chemical release. 
 How to respond to safety incidents ranging from minor to severe. 
 
5. My co-workers always follow safety procedures. This includes  
The use of PPE: 
 Wear appropriate clothes in the laboratory (i.e., closed toe shoes, laboratory coat/smock, and full-length shirts and pants) 
 Don appropriate PPE when handling risky equipment, radioactive materials, and chemicals (e.g., chemical splash goggles, gloves, hot mitts, aprons, 
respirators, etc.). 
Other standard chemical safety procedures: 
 Use of fume hoods when working with chemicals, radioactive material, and any other material that releases hazardous aerosols. 
 Store, label, and date chemicals appropriately. 
 Dispose of waste properly. 
 Respond and react to chemical spills and releases according to procedures. 
 Do not eat in the lab and do not store food with laboratory specimens.  
 Do not pipette by mouth.  
 Safety handling and disposal of sharps.  
 Decontamination of equipment and workspaces. 
 Document safety-related issues and concerns. 
 Operate equipment only after receiving necessary training. 
 
6. Equipment in my lab is checked to make sure it is free of faults (a list of some of the equipment that is likely to be in your lab is provided below). 
 Fume hoods  Refrigerators/Freezers 
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 Autoclaves 
 Biosafety cabinets 
 Centrifuges 
 Lasers 
 Hydraulically- or pneumatically-driven equipment 
 Power and machine tools (e.g., saws, drills, cutting tools, welding 
equipment, solder, table saw, band saw, press, lathe, milling 
machine, etc.) 
 Burners and hot plates 
 Compressed gas cylinders  
 Distillations and condensers 
 Ovens 
 Heating baths  
 Stills 
 Glassware 
 Containers and carts 
 Base units and work tops 
 Storage cabinets 
 
7. Unsafe conditions are promptly corrected in my work area. For instance, 
 The lab is cleaned regularly and clutter is removed.  
 Work surfaces and equipment are decontaminated promptly after completion of work. 
 Non-chemical and chemical spills are promptly taken care of. 
 Chemicals and radioactive material are promptly and appropriately stored. 
 Lasers and other hazardous equipment and machinery are turned off when not in use. 
 Electrical circuits, components, and equipment are grounded before and after use.  
 Sharps and broken glassware are promptly disposed of.  
 
8. My lab manager/PI promotes lab members’ involvement in safety-related matters. This includes 
 Confer with us about safety concerns and new training for equipment (e.g., laser) that may be needed. 
 Discuss with us the best way to comply with new safety regulations imposed by the university and regulatory agencies. 
 Seek input from my workgroup when developing new safety-related procedures (e.g., proper disposal of radioactive waste). 
 Listen attentively to lab members’ safety concerns and seek solutions. 
 Discuss safety in lab meetings. 
 
9. My lab manager/PI praises safe work behavior. Some of the ways he/she might do this are 
 Provide positive feedback when working safely (e.g., proper use of PPE). 
 Recognize lab members for their safe behavior. 
 Give lab members who conduct safe work behavior more discretion and authority (e.g., they are allowed to operate more hazardous equipment). 
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APPENDIX E 
MECHANICAL/ELECTRICAL LABORATORIES SAFETY CLIMATE MEASURE 
Do you work in mechanical and/or electrical laboratory? These laboratories  
 DO NOT involve biological or chemical hazards 
 do involve the use of mechanical/electrical equipment found in a machine shop (e.g., experimental physics or mechanical engineering 
labs). 
 
Yes (direct to the mechanical/electrical measure) 
No (direct to the office lab question) 
 
Thinking of the research laboratory (lab) that you work in, the people you work with in the lab (co-workers), and the people you report to (lab 
manager, Principal Investigator (PI) of the lab), please read the statements listed below and mark the response that indicates the extent to 
which you agree with each statement. 
  
Note – if YOU are a lab manager/PI please respond based on your own behavior. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1. My lab manager/PI strictly enforces the safe working procedures in my workgroup. This includes: 
 Corrects unsafe work practices (e.g., stops lab member from eating in the lab).  
 Does not tolerate a deviation from safe work practices (e.g., sends lab members home to change shoes if they are wearing open-toe shoes). 
 Dismisses lab members from the lab who have a major safety violation that could have been prevented (e.g., working on machinery while 
intoxicated) or repeated instances of unsafe work behavior (e.g., overloading circuits). 
 
2. My lab manager/PI takes a proactive stance when it comes to safety. For example, 
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 Develops and institutes practices to deal with potential safety incidents before they occur (e.g., practices for avoiding electric shock). 
 Emphasizes the importance of safety to all new lab members when they join the lab. 
 Raises safety concerns when planning and developing research projects and studies. 
 Considers the safety ramifications before introducing a new biological or equipment hazard.  
 
3. Safety issues are openly discussed between my lab manager/PI and my workgroup. For instance, we 
 Discuss improper use of personal protective equipment (PPE) and other equipment in the lab. 
 Discuss proper handling and storage of lab materials and equipment. 
 Share lessons learned following a safety-related incident in our lab or other labs (e.g., severe injury and deaths caused by an electrical fire).  
 
4. There is adequate safety training in my lab. Some of the things that we could be informed about and given initial and refresher training on include: 
 Standards and guidelines described in the following: 
o TAMU Safety Manual: Electrical Safety 
o TAMU Safety Manual: Shop Safety 
o TAMU Office of Engineering Safety: Hand Tool and Power Tool Safety Checklist 
 The nature of equipment hazards and how to protect ourselves. 
 How to respond to safety incidents ranging from minor to severe. 
 
5. My co-workers always follow safety procedures. This includes 
The use of PPE: 
 Wear closed toe shoes and clothing that is not loose. 
 Do not wear loose fitting clothing, excessive jewelry, or keep long loose hair. 
 Don appropriate PPE when handling risky equipment (e.g., safety glasses, goggles, face shields, hardhat, etc.). 
Other standard mechanical/electrical safety procedures: 
 Operate equipment only after receiving necessary training. 
 Turn off power and unplug before working on electric or electric circuits. 
 Check wiring before turning on the power supply for a circuit or other electrical equipment. 
 Do not overload circuits. 
 Properly handle, store, and dispose batteries, cells, capacitors, and inductors. 
 Ensure adequate ventilation to prevent exposure to dust and fumes. 
 Ensure that tools and equipment are properly grounded and use tool and equipment guards. 
 Do not force power and machine tools when cutting. 
 Properly transporting and storing tools to ensure safety. 
 Never leave an unattended active tool or equipment running. 
 Ensure you are alert and attentive while handling dangerous machinery and never work alone. 
 Do not eat in the lab/shop. 
 Document safety-related issues and concerns (e.g., notify lab manager/PI about defective tools or equipment). 
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6. Equipment in my lab is checked to make sure it is free of faults (a list of some of the equipment and furniture that is likely to be in your lab is provided 
below). 
 Hand tools (e.g., axes, wrenches, hammers, chisels, screw drivers, 
saw blades, knives, etc.) 
 Power tools (e.g., saws, drills, cutting tools, welding equipment, 
solder, table saw, band saw, press, lathe, milling machine, etc.) 
 Hydraulically- or pneumatically-driven equipment 
 Batteries, cells, capacitors, inductors, or other storage devices.  
 Soldering irons  
 Electrical circuits 
 Electrical conductors 
 Lasers 
 Chemicals used for cleaning (e.g., ethanol alcohol, isopropyl 
alcohol, and acetone) 
 Ladders 
 Wiring and cords 
 Containers and carts 
 Base units and work tops 
 Storage cabinets 
 
7. Unsafe conditions are promptly corrected in my work area. For instance, 
 The lab is cleaned regularly and clutter and debris including sawdust, wood chips, and metal chips are removed.  
 Batteries, cells, capacitors, and inductors are promptly and appropriately stored. 
 Defective or broken tools and equipment are promptly replaced. 
 Lights are replaced when they burn out. 
 Cutting tools are kept sharp. 
 Chemicals used for cleaning are promptly and appropriately stored. 
 Hazardous equipment and machinery are turned off when not in use. 
 Electrical circuits, components, and equipment are grounded before and after use.  
 
8. My lab manager/PI promotes lab members’ involvement in safety-related matters. This includes 
 Confer with us about safety concerns and new training for equipment (e.g., band saw) that may be needed. 
 Discuss with us the best way to comply with new safety regulations imposed by the university and regulatory agencies. 
 Seek input from my workgroup when developing new safety-related procedures (e.g., proper distance from machinery when in use). 
 Listen attentively to lab members’ safety concerns and seek solutions. 
 Discuss safety in lab meetings. 
 
9. My lab manager/PI praises safe work behavior. Some of the ways he/she might do this are 
 Provide positive feedback when working safely (e.g., proper use of PPE). 
 Recognize lab members for their safe behavior. 
 Give lab members who conduct safe work behavior more discretion and authority (e.g., they are allowed to operate more hazardous equipment).  
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APPENDIX F 
HUMAN SUBJECTS/OFFICE LABORATORIES SAFETY CLIMATE MEASURE 
Do you work in a human subjects laboratory? In these laboratories 
 humans are the subjects/participants 
 do NOT have a Biosafety Level (BSL) rating. 
 Regulated by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
 
Yes (direct to human subjects/office measure) 
No (direct to next question) 
 
Do you work in a computer laboratory? These laboratories  
 DO NOT involve biological, chemical, or mechanical hazards 
 may be in an office-like environment. 
 
Yes (direct to human subjects/office measure) 
No (direct to generic lab question) 
 
Thinking of the research laboratory (lab) that you work in, the people you work with in the lab (co-workers), and the people you report to (lab 
manager, Principal Investigator (PI) of the lab), please read the statements listed below and mark the response that indicates the extent to 
which you agree with each statement. 
  
Note – if YOU are a lab manager/PI please respond based on your own behavior. 
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Strongly Disagree Disagree 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1. My lab manager/PI strictly enforces the safe working procedures in my workgroup. This includes: 
 Corrects unsafe work practices (e.g., stops lab member from using a desk chair instead of a stepladder to reach materials up high) 
 Does not tolerate a deviation from safe work practices (e.g., reprimands lab members for creating tripping hazards with clutter) 
 Dismisses lab members from the lab who have a major safety violation that could have been prevented (e.g., starting a fire by placing a space heater 
near combustible material) or repeated instances of unsafe work behavior (e.g., leaving the lab unlocked at night). 
 
2. My lab manager/PI takes a proactive stance when it comes to safety. For example, 
 Develops and institutes practices to deal with potential safety incidents before they occur (e.g., practices for avoiding electric shock). 
 Emphasizes the importance of safety to all new lab members when they join the lab. 
 Raises safety concerns when planning and developing research projects and studies. 
 Considers the safety ramifications before introducing an equipment hazard. 
 
3. Safety issues are openly discussed between my lab manager/PI and my workgroup. For instance, we 
 Discuss improper use of equipment in the lab. 
 Discuss proper handling and storage of lab materials and equipment. 
 Share lessons learned following a safety-related incident in our lab or other labs (e.g., severe injuries caused by falling equipment).  
 
4. There is adequate safety training in my lab. Some of the things that we could be informed about and given initial and refresher training on include: 
 Standards and guidelines described in the following: 
o TAMU Safety Manual: Office Safety 
o TAMU Office of Engineering Safety: Office Safety 
 The nature of equipment hazards and how to protect ourselves. 
 How to respond to safety incidents ranging from minor to severe. 
 
5. My co-workers always follow safety procedures. This includes 
 Ensure all computers are off before moving or handling wiring. 
 Wear closed toe shoes when moving equipment. 
 Limit unnecessary clutter. 
 Avoid tripping hazards (e.g., upturned edges, frayed, or buckled carpets or mats, wet floors, uneven floors). 
 Avoid having too many plugs in an outlet.  
 Inspect and replace faulty wiring. 
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 Heavy files are stored in the bottom of filing cabinets. 
 Large cabinets are secured to prevent tipping. 
 Store material/equipment securely and such that they are easy to access. 
 Use a stepladder rather than an office chair to reach materials up high. 
 Document safety-related issues and concerns. 
 Operate equipment only after receiving necessary training. 
 
6. Equipment in my lab is checked to make sure it is free of faults (a list of some of the equipment and furniture that is likely to be in your lab is provided 
below). 
 Wiring 
 Extension cords 
 Computers 
 Stepladders 
 Copiers 
 Microwaves 
 Furniture including file cabinets, shelves, desks, and chairs 
 Office supplies 
 
7. Unsafe conditions are promptly corrected in my work area. For instance, 
 The lab is cleaned regularly and clutter is removed.  
 Waste containers are emptied regularly. 
 Broken glass is carefully handled and disposed of. 
 Tripping hazards are taken care of. 
 Lights are replaced when they burn out. 
 Plugs are moved when there are too many in one outlet. 
 Hazardous equipment and machinery are turned off when not in use. 
 The lab is closed and locked when not in use. 
 
8. My lab manager/PI promotes lab members’ involvement in safety-related matters. This includes 
 Confer with us about safety concerns and new training for equipment (e.g., copier) that may be needed. 
 Discuss with us the best way to comply with new safety regulations imposed by the university and regulatory agencies. 
 Seek input from my workgroup when developing new safety-related procedures (e.g., safe storage). 
 Listen attentively to lab members’ safety concerns and seek solutions. 
 Discuss safety in lab meetings. 
 
9. My lab manager/PI praises safe work behavior. Some of the ways he/she might do this are 
 Provide positive feedback when working safely (e.g., bending at the knees to lift heavy boxes). 
 Recognize lab members for their safe behavior. 
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 Give lab members who conduct safe work behavior more discretion and authority (e.g., they are allowed to work in the lab independently). 
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APPENDIX G 
GENERIC LABORATORIES SAFETY CLIMATE MEASURE 
It appears that none of the questions we posed are descriptive of the research laboratory you work in. Please describe the lab that you work in 
including any hazards that you are exposed to: _________________________________ (direct to a generic lab safety measure) 
 
Thinking of the research laboratory (lab) that you work in, the people you work with in the lab (co-workers), and the people you report to (lab 
manager, Principal Investigator (PI) of the lab), please read the statements listed below and mark the response that indicates the extent to 
which you agree with each statement. 
  
Note – if YOU are a lab manager/PI please respond based on your own behavior. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1. My lab manager/PI strictly enforces the safe working procedures in my workgroup. This includes: 
 Corrects unsafe work practices (examples below) 
o Stops lab member from eating in the lab; stops a lab member from using an x-ray machine without their personal dosimeter; stops lab 
member from using a desk chair instead of a stepladder to reach materials up high 
 Does not tolerate a deviation from safe work practices  (examples below) 
o Sends lab members home to change shoes if they are wearing open-toe shoes; stops lab member from using a desk chair instead of a 
stepladder to reach materials up high 
 Dismisses lab members from the lab who have a major safety violation that could have been prevented (examples below) 
o An injury caused by the improper use of machinery; an overexposure to high levels of radiation; leaving animal cages open; working on 
machinery while intoxicated; starting a fire by placing a space heater near combustible material) or repeated instances of unsafe work 
behavior (e.g., storing incompatible chemicals together; improper biohazardous material disposal; animal bites caused by improper 
handling; overloading circuits; leaving the lab unlocked at night 
 
2. My lab manager/PI takes a proactive stance when it comes to safety. For example, 
  137 
 Develops and institutes practices to deal with potential safety incidents before they occur (examples below) 
o Practices for avoiding electric shock; practices for avoiding accidental exposure to infectious agents; practices for avoiding inhalation of 
hazardous aerosols 
 Emphasizes the importance of safety to all new lab members when they join the lab. 
 Raises safety concerns when planning and developing research projects and studies. 
 Considers the safety ramifications before introducing a new chemical or equipment hazard. 
 
3. Safety issues are openly discussed between my lab manager/PI and my workgroup. For instance, we 
 Discuss improper use of personal protective equipment (PPE) and other equipment in the lab. 
 Discuss proper chemical handling, labeling, storage, and disposal. 
 Discuss proper biohazardous material handling, labeling, storage, and disposal. 
 Discuss proper animal care including handling, feeding, cage cleaning, and disposal. 
 Discuss proper handling and storage of lab materials and equipment. 
 Share lessons learned following a safety-related incident in our lab or other labs (examples below) 
o Severe injuries and deaths caused by improper chemical handling, exposure, falling equipment, or an electrical fire  
 
4. There is adequate safety training in my workgroup. Some of the things that we could be informed about and given initial and refresher training on 
include: 
 Standards and guidelines described in the following: 
o Texas A&M EHS Chemical Laboratory Safety and Hazard Communication Compliance Manual  
o TAMU Safety Manual: Chemical Safety 
o Center for Disease Control’s (CDC) Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories  
o U.S. Department of Health and Human Services NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid and 
Molecules 
o TAMU Safety Manual: Electrical Safety 
o TAMU Safety Manual: Shop Safety 
o TAMU Office of Engineering Safety: Hand Tool and Power Tool Safety Checklist 
o TAMU Safety Manual: Office Safety 
o TAMU Office of Engineering Safety: Office Safety 
 The nature of chemical, biological (e.g., infectious) material, animal, and/or equipment hazards and how to protect ourselves. 
 Proper detection and response to a chemical or biohazard release.  
 How to respond to safety incidents ranging from minor to severe. 
 
5. My co-workers always follow safety procedures. This includes  
The use of PPE: 
 Wear appropriate clothes in the laboratory (i.e., closed toe shoes, laboratory coat/smock, and full-length shirts and pants) 
 Don appropriate PPE when handling risky equipment, radioactive materials, chemicals, and biohazards (e.g., chemical splash goggles, 
gloves/gauntlets, hot mitts, aprons, respirators, face shield, hardhats, etc.). 
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 Wear closed toe shoes and clothing that is not loose. 
 Do not wear loose fitting clothing, excessive jewelry, or keep long loose hair. 
Other standard safety procedures: 
 Use of biosafety cabinet when working with biohazards. 
 Use of fume hoods when working with chemicals, radioactive material, and any other material that releases hazardous aerosols. 
 Store, label, and date biohazards and chemicals appropriately. 
 Dispose of chemical, biohazardous/infectious and/or animal waste properly. 
 Respond and react to chemical and/or infectious material spills and releases according to procedures. 
 Do not eat in the lab and do not store food with laboratory specimens.  
 Do not pipette by mouth.  
 Safety handling and disposal of sharps.  
 Decontamination of equipment, workspaces, and infectious material. 
 Document safety-related issues and concerns (e.g., notify lab manager/PI about defective tools or equipment). 
 Operate equipment and/or work with animals only after receiving necessary training. 
 Appropriate animal cage decontamination, cleaning, and washing. 
 Turn off power and unplug before working on electric or electric circuits. 
 Check wiring before turning on the power supply for a circuit or other electrical equipment. 
 Do not overload circuits. 
 Properly handle, store, and dispose batteries, cells, capacitors, and inductors. 
 Ensure adequate ventilation to prevent exposure to dust and fumes. 
 Ensure that tools and equipment are properly grounded and use tool and equipment guards. 
 Do not force power and machine tools when cutting. 
 Properly transporting and storing tools to ensure safety. 
 Never leave an unattended active tool or equipment running. 
 Ensure you are alert and attentive while handling dangerous machinery and never work alone. 
 Wear closed toe shoes when moving equipment. 
 Limit unnecessary clutter. 
 Avoid tripping hazards (e.g., upturned edges, frayed, or buckled carpets or mats, wet floors, uneven floors). 
 Avoid having too many plugs in an outlet.  
 Inspect and replace faulty wiring. 
 Heavy files are stored in the bottom of filing cabinets. 
 Large cabinets are secured to prevent tipping. 
 Store material/equipment securely and such that they are easy to access. 
 Use a stepladder rather than an office chair to reach materials up high. 
 
6. Equipment in my lab is checked to make sure it is free of faults (a list of some of the equipment that is likely to be in your lab is provided below). 
 Fume hoods  Incinerators 
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 Autoclaves 
 Biosafety cabinets 
 Centrifuges 
 Lasers 
 Hydraulically- or pneumatically-driven equipment 
 Hand tools (e.g., axes, wrenches, hammers, chisels, screw drivers, 
saw blades, knives, etc.) 
 Power tools (e.g., saws, drills, cutting tools, welding equipment, 
solder, table saw, band saw, press, lathe, milling machine, etc.) 
 Batteries, cells, capacitors, inductors, or other storage devices.  
 Soldering irons  
 Electrical circuits 
 Electrical conductors 
 X-ray equipment 
 Exercise equipment (e.g., treadmill, weightlifting equipment, 
stationary bicycles) 
 Burners and hot plates  
 Animal cages 
 Cage washers (rack washer, cabinet washer, tunnel washer) 
 Refrigerators/Freezers  
 Compressed gas cylinders  
 Distillations and condensers 
 Ovens 
 Heating baths  
 Hydrostatic weighing tank 
 Stills 
 Glassware 
 Chemicals used for cleaning (e.g., ethanol alcohol, isopropyl 
alcohol, and acetone) 
 Ladders 
 Wiring and cords 
 Extension cords 
 Computers 
 Stepladders 
 Copiers 
 Containers and carts 
 Base units and work tops 
 Storage cabinets Microwaves 
 Furniture including file cabinets, shelves, desks, and chairs 
 Office supplies 
 
 
7. Unsafe conditions are promptly corrected in my work area. For instance, 
 The lab (potentially including animal cages) is cleaned regularly and clutter and debris including sawdust, wood chips, and metal chips are 
removed. 
 Work surfaces and equipment are decontaminated promptly after completion of work. 
 Infectious material and chemical spills and releases and/or animal waste are promptly taken care of. 
 Biohazards, chemicals, and/or radioactive material are promptly and appropriately stored. 
 Hazardous equipment and machinery are turned off when not in use. 
 Electrical circuits, components, and equipment are grounded before and after use.  
 Sharps and broken glassware are promptly disposed of.  
 Work surfaces and equipment are decontaminated promptly after completion of work. 
 Batteries, cells, capacitors, and inductors are promptly and appropriately stored. 
 Defective or broken tools and equipment are promptly replaced. 
 Lights are replaced when they burn out. 
 Cutting tools are kept sharp. 
 Waste containers are emptied regularly. 
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 Broken glass is carefully handled and disposed of. 
 Tripping hazards are taken care of. 
 Plugs are moved when there are too many in one outlet. 
 The lab is closed and locked when not in use. 
 
8. My lab manager/PI promotes lab members’ involvement in safety-related matters. This includes 
 Confer with us about safety concerns and new training for equipment (e.g., laser, band saw, x-ray machine, copier) that may be needed. 
 Discuss with us the best way to comply with new safety regulations imposed by the university and regulatory agencies. 
 Seek input from my workgroup when developing new safety-related procedures (e.g., proper disposal of radioactive and/or biohazard waste; 
handling animals; proper distance from machinery when in use; safe storage). 
 Listen attentively to lab members’ safety concerns and seek solutions. 
 Discuss safety in lab meetings. 
 
9. My lab manager/PI praises safe work behavior. Some of the ways he/she might do this are 
 Provide positive feedback when working safely (e.g., proper use of PPE; bending at the knees to lift heavy boxes). 
 Recognize lab members for their safe behavior. 
 Give lab members who conduct safe work behavior more discretion and authority (e.g., they are allowed to operate more hazardous equipment; they 
are allowed to work in the lab independently). 
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APPENDIX H 
PERCEIVED RISK AND SAFETY PREDICTORS 
Self-report injuries, incidents, and near misses 
In the last 12 months, how many times have you been injured while working in the lab (any kind of injury including a scrape, cut, burn, 
etc.)? 
_________________ 
 
In the last 12 months, how many incidents have you had that did NOT result in injury (e.g., equipment damage, chemical release)? 
_________________ 
 
In the last 12 months, how many near misses or near accidents (i.e., incidents that could have resulted in harm to persons or equipment but 
did not) have you had (e.g., improper use of PPE, lab left unlocked)? 
_________________ 
 
 
Perceived job risk 
Please mark the response that indicates the extent 
to which each statement is true. 
Almost Always 
Untrue 
Often 
Untrue 
Sometimes 
Untrue/Sometimes True 
Often 
True 
Almost 
Always True 
1. I encounter personally hazardous situations 
while in the laboratory. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. My job in the lab is physically dangerous. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. I am directly exposed to physical harm in 
carrying out my job in the lab. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Safety participation 
Please mark the response that indicates the extent to which you 
agree with each statement. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. I promote safety within the laboratory. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. I put in extra effort to improve the safety of the laboratory. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. I help my co-workers when they are working under risky or 
hazardous conditions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
  142 
Please mark the response that indicates the extent to which you 
agree with each statement. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
4. I voluntarily carry out tasks or activities that help to improve 
laboratory safety. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Safety knowledge 
Please mark the response that indicates the extent to which you 
agree with each statement. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. I know how to perform my job in the lab in a safe manner. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. I know how to use safety equipment and standard laboratory 
procedures. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I know how to maintain or improve laboratory health and 
safety. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I know how to reduce the risk of accidents and incidents in the 
laboratory. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Safety compliance 
Please mark the response that indicates the extent to which you 
agree with each statement. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. I carry out my work in the lab in a safe manner. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. I use all the necessary safety equipment to do my job in the lab. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. I use the correct safety procedures for carrying out my job in 
the lab. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I ensure the highest levels of safety when I carry out my job in 
the lab. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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APPENDIX I 
LAB-SPECIFIC QUESTIONS AND DEMOGRAPHICS 
1. At what level is your current position in the lab? 
 Undergraduate student 
 Graduate student 
 Post-doc 
 Lab manager (not a student or post-doc) 
 Research Scientists 
 Research Associate 
 Principal Investigator (PI) 
 Other  (___________________________) 
 
2. Approximately, how long have you worked in your current lab (in months)? 
______________ 
3. Approximately, how many members are in your lab (including yourself)? 
______________ 
4. If you have worked in a laboratory at another university, please indicate the extent to which you feel safer in your TAMU lab. 
 N/A (I have never worked in another lab) 
 Much Less Safe 
 Somewhat Less Safe 
 Equally Safe 
 Somewhat More Safe 
 Much More Safe 
 
5. What is your race? 
 African-American/Black (not Hispanic or Latino) 
 American Indian or Alaska Native (not Hispanic or Latino) 
 Asian (not Hispanic or Latino) 
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 Latino or Hispanic 
 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander (not Hispanic or Latino) 
 White (not Hispanic or Latino) 
 Other heritage    ______________________________ 
 
6. What is your sex? 
 Male 
 Female 
 
7. What is your age in years? 
________________________ 
 
